It's become quite clear that spending too much time with one person is bound to bring some disquietude. And, I've been spending too much time with Procopius. So, where possible, I've taken a little break to continue work on finishing up a project on the Roman military in the Moesias.
Today I've been thinking about auxiliary constitutions (the official citizenship document in Rome) and diplomas (the copies, the ones found all across the empire), and the related matter of recruitment. Just read a paper by Paul Holder on copies of constitutions. He calculated that if every province with auxiliary units had men eligible for discharge every year there could have been some 4,000 men "recorded on the original bronze constitutions set up at Rome". That's a staggering number - and as I said just an estimate. The figures that supported his claim include: c. 50% of serving men lasted 25 years and so were eligible for discharge; 10 men each year from a quingenary unit (about 500-man unit); 18 men from a milliary unit (about 800-1000-men); 370 units in existence during the reign of Hadrian. A number of questions popped into my mind upon reading this (and some of this other observations).
First, if those numbers hold up, and they don't seem unreasonable to me at first glance, how many bronze constitutions might have been produced and stored in Rome each year? Would there necessarily have been just the one constitution issued per province per year? Would the government want a record of each soldier? Depending on how the numbers add up, we could be dealing with a staggering number of documents kept by Rome. Would there be some sort of file for each soldier that tracked his record throughout his career? Would this be in Rome, or would it just be an outline, so to speak there, with the details in his respective province? Or, would it all be kept in his province? And yet, many soldiers moved around (or those with some initiative might), and so would a file move with him? Perhaps these would have been on less permanent materials, and only the really important stuff, like discharge certificates, would be recorded on permanent materials. Anyway, it might be that this is unanswerable, but I thought I'd ask anyway.
The other issue alluded to above was recruitment. Should we expect regular recruitment, that is a consistent number of men each and every year? Or was it always, or partly, a hodgepodge approach? Things are happening in province X, how many men are in province X, and so let's then raise Y men to compensate. Most likely it always did vary - we know additional units (both auxiliary and legionary) were raised at different times. Some units were lost, some were depleted, and some additional ones were needed for major campaigns, like Trajan's war of conquest. I guess that means we should expect some 25 years or so after the start of a major campaign that there should be an explosion, of sort, of men available for discharge. And yet, these new units often weren't disbanded once a war ended. A unit might move on, but they didn't get dissolved just because a war was over. Perhaps then it's a series of steady periods of recruitment followed by giant spikes at war time (major war).
I think I might be rambling now...so...best stop. Besides, I have some diplomas to read/compare, and some more reading to do. Thinking too about the merits of updating Watson's The Roman Soldier.
Monday 17 November 2014
Friday 17 October 2014
Procopius' Authority: autopsy, bias, and the truth
As I slowly work away on this book and some of these source questions, this blog might be transforming itself into a forum where I can share my thoughts about how things are progressing. This might be a useful exercise. I should stress, as I might have done before, that since this is a blog, I don't spend much time on the revising (it comes out after I write it).
With that in mind...
Procopius writes in the tradition of classical historians like Herodotus and Thucydides. In fact, in many ways his work engages directly with those very historians. One of the many parts of his Wars where this is particularly evident is the preface, where the historian is to set out his task and state his claims and argue why he (invariably) is the man for the job. If you read Procopius' preface, it reads very much like the preface of a host of earlier classical historians.
Most of the claims that he makes serve to establish his authority, the why he's the man for the job bit. So he includes the claim, from me previous post, in which he discusses the importance of autopsy, at least from his perspective. He was well suited to this task - describing the wars of Justinian - because he happened to become an advisor to Belisarius, the famous general and participant for most of the action, and because Procopius himself saw almost everything that he describes (1.1.3). Autopsy stressed: Procopius is a sensible historian.
Of course, someone could easily come along and question whether Procopius was as trustworthy as he claims to be. It's all well and good to emphasize autopsy, and to have been an eye-witness, but readers will need to know why they can trust you and your experiences. Questions had been raised about the value of autopsy for some time. Luckily for modern and ancient readers alike, Procopius is no slouch. No, he goes on to set out why exactly it is that he deserves to be believed. He claims (1.1.4) that truth is the most relevant thing to history (well ξυγγραφῇ ), and that this is what he's writing. So, Procopius was an eyewitness, he's written a history, and he argues that truth is the most important thing in history.
There is still room for shoddy writing, and to counter any other possible criticisms, most notably claims of bias (and Belisarius is undoubtedly the obvious target of this), Procopius then comes out (1.1.5) and says that he's gone and written everything exactly as it is (with accuracy that is) about those he knows, whether they did good things or bad things. He even stresses that he hasn't concealed their failures. Just after this, before he gets to his oft-discussed comparison of contemporary and Homeric archers, he comes back to the role of truth. For he says that the events that he's about to describe are the best, at least if someone wants to base their judgements on the truth.
To take stock then: Procopius has said I'm the best man for the job because I had a prime position to see and experience everything and was there for most things, truth is highly valued in history and if you do too you'll see that my work is the best, and I have not given any signs of bias, but rather have said everything about those concerned. Thus, on the basis of his own criteria, if we are to evaluate Procopius' own discussion then we can see that he's up to the job. We can afford him the kind of respect that we do Thucydides and Polybius, for instance. Of course, conscientious modern historians don't take Procopius at his word - much more work is needed. But, the fact that he's gone and said this often does allay some fears.
One issue that complicates things is Procopius' statements in the much debated Secret History. There he states that he couldn't say everything that he wanted in the Wars because things were, essentially, too precarious. He seems to imply that he feared for his safety if he was to come out and openly bash some of the key participants, and Justinian is the one he has particularly in mind. Does this mean we should toss out the Wars? Well, no, because we are conscientious, and he doesn't, for example, spend a whole lot of time explicitly discussing Justinian in the Wars anyway, at least relatively speaking - though he's always there, somewhere, looming in the background, so to speak. Moreover, based on what work I've done on Procopius in the past, he does seem to be forthright about most things, and where things might have been sketchy, he simply doesn't discuss them (he's not lying, he's just being selective).
Anyway, that's essentially the setting out of the claims of Procopius himself about whether he should trust him - the basis on which discussions of autopsy are based, or how far we should believe them. As always, more to come...
With that in mind...
Procopius writes in the tradition of classical historians like Herodotus and Thucydides. In fact, in many ways his work engages directly with those very historians. One of the many parts of his Wars where this is particularly evident is the preface, where the historian is to set out his task and state his claims and argue why he (invariably) is the man for the job. If you read Procopius' preface, it reads very much like the preface of a host of earlier classical historians.
Most of the claims that he makes serve to establish his authority, the why he's the man for the job bit. So he includes the claim, from me previous post, in which he discusses the importance of autopsy, at least from his perspective. He was well suited to this task - describing the wars of Justinian - because he happened to become an advisor to Belisarius, the famous general and participant for most of the action, and because Procopius himself saw almost everything that he describes (1.1.3). Autopsy stressed: Procopius is a sensible historian.
Of course, someone could easily come along and question whether Procopius was as trustworthy as he claims to be. It's all well and good to emphasize autopsy, and to have been an eye-witness, but readers will need to know why they can trust you and your experiences. Questions had been raised about the value of autopsy for some time. Luckily for modern and ancient readers alike, Procopius is no slouch. No, he goes on to set out why exactly it is that he deserves to be believed. He claims (1.1.4) that truth is the most relevant thing to history (well ξυγγραφῇ ), and that this is what he's writing. So, Procopius was an eyewitness, he's written a history, and he argues that truth is the most important thing in history.
There is still room for shoddy writing, and to counter any other possible criticisms, most notably claims of bias (and Belisarius is undoubtedly the obvious target of this), Procopius then comes out (1.1.5) and says that he's gone and written everything exactly as it is (with accuracy that is) about those he knows, whether they did good things or bad things. He even stresses that he hasn't concealed their failures. Just after this, before he gets to his oft-discussed comparison of contemporary and Homeric archers, he comes back to the role of truth. For he says that the events that he's about to describe are the best, at least if someone wants to base their judgements on the truth.
To take stock then: Procopius has said I'm the best man for the job because I had a prime position to see and experience everything and was there for most things, truth is highly valued in history and if you do too you'll see that my work is the best, and I have not given any signs of bias, but rather have said everything about those concerned. Thus, on the basis of his own criteria, if we are to evaluate Procopius' own discussion then we can see that he's up to the job. We can afford him the kind of respect that we do Thucydides and Polybius, for instance. Of course, conscientious modern historians don't take Procopius at his word - much more work is needed. But, the fact that he's gone and said this often does allay some fears.
One issue that complicates things is Procopius' statements in the much debated Secret History. There he states that he couldn't say everything that he wanted in the Wars because things were, essentially, too precarious. He seems to imply that he feared for his safety if he was to come out and openly bash some of the key participants, and Justinian is the one he has particularly in mind. Does this mean we should toss out the Wars? Well, no, because we are conscientious, and he doesn't, for example, spend a whole lot of time explicitly discussing Justinian in the Wars anyway, at least relatively speaking - though he's always there, somewhere, looming in the background, so to speak. Moreover, based on what work I've done on Procopius in the past, he does seem to be forthright about most things, and where things might have been sketchy, he simply doesn't discuss them (he's not lying, he's just being selective).
Anyway, that's essentially the setting out of the claims of Procopius himself about whether he should trust him - the basis on which discussions of autopsy are based, or how far we should believe them. As always, more to come...
Procopius' Use of Autopsy
When the issues of veracity and reliability in ancient historians surface in the scholarly literature, discussion regularly turns to three ways that an ancient historian gathered (invariably) his information: autopsy, oral accounts, and written sources. Autopsy is usually, but not always, the highest ranking of the lot.
Although seemingly straightforward, autopsy has different meanings. There is the careful examination of a corpse - this is not what is meant in these cases, obviously. It can mean the personal observation or experience of a thing (or what have). But it can also mean the critical examination of something (subject, work). So, it should be clear that the autopsy referred to by scholars could fall into either of those second two categories; and, it should be clear why the lack of clarity might be a cause of concern. When the word opsis is used, it's easy to see what the person has in mind. But in others it's less so. With that said, most modern scholars usually have the former in mind: personal observation and experience (there is a significant discussion of it in Marincola's 1997 book that I must have read a decade or so ago, but which is a bit hazy in my mind at present).
In both cases, it can be hard to work out which one an ancient historian is employing. If it's the former, sometimes ancient historians will make comments in the first person or otherwise which imply that they had seen something which makes it easy enough to determine. If it's the latter it's a bit trickier, but sometimes historians will make a comment about something they've read or seen and what they think about it. They'll even make comments, rarely, about competing accounts. The one historian who seems to be explicitly engaged in a fair amount of autopsy of both kinds of Herodotus, and his impact has been significant.
I've already made some comments in an earlier post - and will do so in more final versions of all this - about Procopius' own experiences, which in turn hinted at autopsy in the Wars (I've left out the Buildings and Secret History, though my first impressions that is that with the SH much of the information is purportedly autopsy, and that it is harder to say with the Build.). Procopius does hint at the role of autopsy in his own account, as one (ancient historian) should, in the preface. He says he's well suited to the task, writing the wars of Justinian: "Furthermore he had assurance that he was especially competent to write the history of these events, if for no other reason, because it fell to his lot, when appointed advisor to the general Belisarius, to be an eye-witness to practically all the events to be described" (1.1.3). So, pretty explicit stuff.
As I said the character Procopius acts on occasion in the Wars, though given his position in Belisarius' army and what he's said in the preface, there has been little doubt that he did see a great deal of what he describes. Even for Procopius himself, then, autopsy ranks highly - following in the vein of Herodotus and Thucydides, amongst others. Now, this second large project, well, like most of my other work, deals with military stuff, and so that includes battles, sieges, campaigns, and the like. But we know, and have known for some time, that these things are hard to describe in part because of the mass chaos that ensues, especially in combat. This might not apply quite so much with respect to campaigns (marching, supply gathering, etc.), but still things might not have been as straightforward as they appear.
One question/issue that springs to mind with all of this is: where would Procopius have been when all the action was going on? If he was the advisor/secretary to Belisarius, then he was invariably engaged in all sorts of important tasks, and would have been in a position (here, more metaphorically - not physically but vis-a-vis his relationship to Belisarius) to acquire good information. When it came to witnessing things, what then? If we accept that one of Procopius' duties was to write up battle reports - and some think he was at least responsible for sending the letters that sometimes pop up in the Gothic Wars - is he much more likely to have been in a position to see things with his own eyes - engage in this autopsy? In a battle then, if we assume a Hellenistic or Odyssean general is assumed we he be seated on a horse at the back of the Roman side beholding all that transpired before him? In this case it would matter a great deal if the topography of the site enabled such a vantage point. It would be easier, too, to wittiness combat in a siege if he was on the defensive side, like Rome in 537/538. One could easily imagine a Procopius on the walls looking down on the Goths with appropriate record-keeping materials observing all that transpires.
Yet, those sorts of positions, at the back of a battle or at the walls of a city during a siege, aren't the safest of places in the best of times. If he had been in those positions from the get-go, and if he was simply a writer with little combat experience or ability, it is something of a surprise that he was able to survive all of the engagements that he described. Is this reasonable? Well, yes: not all war reporters are killed in war zones. Procopius could have survived all such instances. With that said, it is not more reasonable to assume that he wasn't close by watching, but rather safely ensconced in the camp or within the city walls when skirmishes were breaking out? How much autopsy then went into his battle descriptions? Perhaps not a whole lot. Even so, it would be difficult for anyone to describe any of these battles or sieges, whether simply a participant relaying activities to friends or family, or a general or member of staff reporting the results to the higher ups. This also raises questions about what might actually have been in the battle reports that might have been made. Could there have been any expectation that there would be any real detail in these? Or would they be the bare bones, the most relevant of details (as many have surmised) instead?
On the other hand, does this then take things too far into post-modern territory? In other words, can we recover nothing? I don't think so. There's just a number of interesting questions that pop up in these sorts of discussions.
More to come...
Although seemingly straightforward, autopsy has different meanings. There is the careful examination of a corpse - this is not what is meant in these cases, obviously. It can mean the personal observation or experience of a thing (or what have). But it can also mean the critical examination of something (subject, work). So, it should be clear that the autopsy referred to by scholars could fall into either of those second two categories; and, it should be clear why the lack of clarity might be a cause of concern. When the word opsis is used, it's easy to see what the person has in mind. But in others it's less so. With that said, most modern scholars usually have the former in mind: personal observation and experience (there is a significant discussion of it in Marincola's 1997 book that I must have read a decade or so ago, but which is a bit hazy in my mind at present).
In both cases, it can be hard to work out which one an ancient historian is employing. If it's the former, sometimes ancient historians will make comments in the first person or otherwise which imply that they had seen something which makes it easy enough to determine. If it's the latter it's a bit trickier, but sometimes historians will make a comment about something they've read or seen and what they think about it. They'll even make comments, rarely, about competing accounts. The one historian who seems to be explicitly engaged in a fair amount of autopsy of both kinds of Herodotus, and his impact has been significant.
I've already made some comments in an earlier post - and will do so in more final versions of all this - about Procopius' own experiences, which in turn hinted at autopsy in the Wars (I've left out the Buildings and Secret History, though my first impressions that is that with the SH much of the information is purportedly autopsy, and that it is harder to say with the Build.). Procopius does hint at the role of autopsy in his own account, as one (ancient historian) should, in the preface. He says he's well suited to the task, writing the wars of Justinian: "Furthermore he had assurance that he was especially competent to write the history of these events, if for no other reason, because it fell to his lot, when appointed advisor to the general Belisarius, to be an eye-witness to practically all the events to be described" (1.1.3). So, pretty explicit stuff.
As I said the character Procopius acts on occasion in the Wars, though given his position in Belisarius' army and what he's said in the preface, there has been little doubt that he did see a great deal of what he describes. Even for Procopius himself, then, autopsy ranks highly - following in the vein of Herodotus and Thucydides, amongst others. Now, this second large project, well, like most of my other work, deals with military stuff, and so that includes battles, sieges, campaigns, and the like. But we know, and have known for some time, that these things are hard to describe in part because of the mass chaos that ensues, especially in combat. This might not apply quite so much with respect to campaigns (marching, supply gathering, etc.), but still things might not have been as straightforward as they appear.
One question/issue that springs to mind with all of this is: where would Procopius have been when all the action was going on? If he was the advisor/secretary to Belisarius, then he was invariably engaged in all sorts of important tasks, and would have been in a position (here, more metaphorically - not physically but vis-a-vis his relationship to Belisarius) to acquire good information. When it came to witnessing things, what then? If we accept that one of Procopius' duties was to write up battle reports - and some think he was at least responsible for sending the letters that sometimes pop up in the Gothic Wars - is he much more likely to have been in a position to see things with his own eyes - engage in this autopsy? In a battle then, if we assume a Hellenistic or Odyssean general is assumed we he be seated on a horse at the back of the Roman side beholding all that transpired before him? In this case it would matter a great deal if the topography of the site enabled such a vantage point. It would be easier, too, to wittiness combat in a siege if he was on the defensive side, like Rome in 537/538. One could easily imagine a Procopius on the walls looking down on the Goths with appropriate record-keeping materials observing all that transpires.
Yet, those sorts of positions, at the back of a battle or at the walls of a city during a siege, aren't the safest of places in the best of times. If he had been in those positions from the get-go, and if he was simply a writer with little combat experience or ability, it is something of a surprise that he was able to survive all of the engagements that he described. Is this reasonable? Well, yes: not all war reporters are killed in war zones. Procopius could have survived all such instances. With that said, it is not more reasonable to assume that he wasn't close by watching, but rather safely ensconced in the camp or within the city walls when skirmishes were breaking out? How much autopsy then went into his battle descriptions? Perhaps not a whole lot. Even so, it would be difficult for anyone to describe any of these battles or sieges, whether simply a participant relaying activities to friends or family, or a general or member of staff reporting the results to the higher ups. This also raises questions about what might actually have been in the battle reports that might have been made. Could there have been any expectation that there would be any real detail in these? Or would they be the bare bones, the most relevant of details (as many have surmised) instead?
On the other hand, does this then take things too far into post-modern territory? In other words, can we recover nothing? I don't think so. There's just a number of interesting questions that pop up in these sorts of discussions.
More to come...
Wednesday 15 October 2014
The Value of Sources and the Face of Procopian/Justinianic Warfare
Back to it. Strike while the ember's hot and all that.
Do the references to Procopius' own actions in the sixth century contained within the Wars make a difference to whether we think he's a good historian or not, or at least whether we really ought to use his text? It can, I guess to some degree, provide evidence of his own worth, his authority for discussing the material that he's narrating. This was an age old authority trick by the time Procopius was writing. If he was a participant then would seemingly provide some insight into what happened, though the problems with human memories and eye witnesses demonstrate that we shouldn't put too much stock in affairs. What it probably is really useful for is putting him in a position to get to the materials he'd need to write what he wrote, and to see, with his own eyes, how things worked. Too often we sort of assume, however, that he spent an ordinate amount of time making detailed and accurate notes, when we contain no such definitive evidence.
Even if we are able to get a sense of what kinds of sources he used in different situations, we still have to rank that material. Should things he saw himself rank higher than the rest? Than oral after that? And then dispatches and reports? Or should the order be switched some way? All those references to they say cause problems of their own. There are some examples where they might seem to referring to a particular person or persons, and others where it seems more likely that he's relying on written materials. Often, however, the statements aren't anywhere near clear enough, and in most of the Wars, like any good classicizing historian, he tends to shy away from identifying particular authors. There are exceptions, like Arrian, Herodotus, and Homer, but many of those come from book VIII, and it should be apparent that they have little bearing on current events.
Is this attempt to uncover his sources for particular military events all an exercise in futility? Even if I can uncover any of it, can it really tell us what we should believe? Probably not a whole heck of a lot - rather, we'd need comparable evidence, where it exists.
One last note: back to the doryphoroi. Discussion has often centred on whether Procopius was advocating an era of horse-archery at the expense of the infantry, and it's been suggested that this was partly (or largely) the result of Procopius' attachment to Belisarius. The general himself seems to have used a lot of cavalry, so Procopius would, unsurprisingly, use it and highlight it at the expense of others. Is this mere "bias" on the part of Procopius? Or is he actually reflecting reality? Rance has made a good case that he's not being exactly forthright. What all this thinking about sources has got me thinking, however, is whether the conversation should be shifted towards private armies versus public armies, not cavalry versus infantry. Is this the face of Procopian combat?
It seems that there was a shift towards cavalry, regardless of whether Procopius was overzealous in his reporting of their actions. But he also hints at a shift towards private armies. OK - you could say that the abandonment of the heavy infantry that won Rome its empire is cause for concern. But what about the failure of the state to pay for the armies to keep the empire secure? Or make the desired conquests easier? In some sense, then, what we see is a return to the profiteering of the late republic: soldier-generals fighting each other for power and prestige, while in the process nearly ruining the state. In the republic's case, it was fortunate enough, depending on your perspective, to have a guy like Octavian come round and right the ship. Without him, it's hard to imagine a Rome existing in the form that it did by the time Justinian came around. The sixth and seventh century state, however, didn't have anyone like that. Sure, Heraclius deserves lots of credit for what he did to prevent the ship from going down, but we all know that the empire would never again reach the geographical extent that it once did (and assuming that's the best sign of the strength of an empire - it might not be).
So, more for me to ponder. Yes, think more about sources. Think more about how to evaluate his worth. Think more about he characterizes the various militaries who feature in his works. But think too what was the most significant of those (if there is such a thing).
As always, more to come...
Do the references to Procopius' own actions in the sixth century contained within the Wars make a difference to whether we think he's a good historian or not, or at least whether we really ought to use his text? It can, I guess to some degree, provide evidence of his own worth, his authority for discussing the material that he's narrating. This was an age old authority trick by the time Procopius was writing. If he was a participant then would seemingly provide some insight into what happened, though the problems with human memories and eye witnesses demonstrate that we shouldn't put too much stock in affairs. What it probably is really useful for is putting him in a position to get to the materials he'd need to write what he wrote, and to see, with his own eyes, how things worked. Too often we sort of assume, however, that he spent an ordinate amount of time making detailed and accurate notes, when we contain no such definitive evidence.
Even if we are able to get a sense of what kinds of sources he used in different situations, we still have to rank that material. Should things he saw himself rank higher than the rest? Than oral after that? And then dispatches and reports? Or should the order be switched some way? All those references to they say cause problems of their own. There are some examples where they might seem to referring to a particular person or persons, and others where it seems more likely that he's relying on written materials. Often, however, the statements aren't anywhere near clear enough, and in most of the Wars, like any good classicizing historian, he tends to shy away from identifying particular authors. There are exceptions, like Arrian, Herodotus, and Homer, but many of those come from book VIII, and it should be apparent that they have little bearing on current events.
Is this attempt to uncover his sources for particular military events all an exercise in futility? Even if I can uncover any of it, can it really tell us what we should believe? Probably not a whole heck of a lot - rather, we'd need comparable evidence, where it exists.
One last note: back to the doryphoroi. Discussion has often centred on whether Procopius was advocating an era of horse-archery at the expense of the infantry, and it's been suggested that this was partly (or largely) the result of Procopius' attachment to Belisarius. The general himself seems to have used a lot of cavalry, so Procopius would, unsurprisingly, use it and highlight it at the expense of others. Is this mere "bias" on the part of Procopius? Or is he actually reflecting reality? Rance has made a good case that he's not being exactly forthright. What all this thinking about sources has got me thinking, however, is whether the conversation should be shifted towards private armies versus public armies, not cavalry versus infantry. Is this the face of Procopian combat?
It seems that there was a shift towards cavalry, regardless of whether Procopius was overzealous in his reporting of their actions. But he also hints at a shift towards private armies. OK - you could say that the abandonment of the heavy infantry that won Rome its empire is cause for concern. But what about the failure of the state to pay for the armies to keep the empire secure? Or make the desired conquests easier? In some sense, then, what we see is a return to the profiteering of the late republic: soldier-generals fighting each other for power and prestige, while in the process nearly ruining the state. In the republic's case, it was fortunate enough, depending on your perspective, to have a guy like Octavian come round and right the ship. Without him, it's hard to imagine a Rome existing in the form that it did by the time Justinian came around. The sixth and seventh century state, however, didn't have anyone like that. Sure, Heraclius deserves lots of credit for what he did to prevent the ship from going down, but we all know that the empire would never again reach the geographical extent that it once did (and assuming that's the best sign of the strength of an empire - it might not be).
So, more for me to ponder. Yes, think more about sources. Think more about how to evaluate his worth. Think more about he characterizes the various militaries who feature in his works. But think too what was the most significant of those (if there is such a thing).
As always, more to come...
Procopius' Sources
For the second major Procopius project of mine, I've been investigating sources and thinking about reliability in ways that I wasn't for the first one. It's all much more interesting than I'd considered, and I've benefitted from reading some interesting things of relevance by people like Borm, Whitby, Howard-Johnston, Kaegi, Colvin, Cameron, Greatrex, Treadgold, Parnell (excellent prosopography) and especially Sinclair (military bulletins), among others.
One of the first things that I did was evaluate, or consider, those instances where Procopius, the historical figure, intervened himself in the action, whether it was to provide advice about trumpets, get some intel from Sicily, or scope out some supply routes (and the supplies themselves) for the Romans. He doesn't intervene too often, though when he does he evinces some knowledge and experience with military stuff.
More recently I've turned to campaign reports and bulletins, and oral sources. I've been engaged in some TLG searches with a few choice words and phrases, and they have turned up some interesting results. There are, for instance, far more references to specific spearmen (doryphoroi) and shield-bearers (hypaspistes) than I had appreciated before, and possibly more than there should be given their relative numbers. I had wondered if this was, in part, due to their increased usage - and the connections with buccellarii, Procopius' experiences, and Belisarius' wealth might bear this out - in sixth century combat. But, I've also noticed that it is invariably the spearmen who are mentioned rather than the shield bearers. Not unusual in and of itself - all classical and classicizing (or just about) authors and theorists advocate attention be focused on the elite - though it's definitely something that's worth exploring. I can certainly appreciate why some see these men as the ones who gave Procopius much of his information.
I should add, on the subject of oral sources I'm also taking a look at Procopius' usage of words like phasi. Has a good pedigree, of course. What's stuck me so far is how much he uses it in what I consider the Herodotean parts of the Wars: books 1, 2 and 8 - the majority of usages are found there. This too might not be a coincidence, given, if I recall (off the top of my head) Herodotus' practices.
Bulletins and reports are a tougher nut to crack. None of these survive, save a possible example in the Chronicon Paschale. We also lack all those strength reports from the earlier empire, which seem to hint at some sort of record keeping of this sort, at least to my mind. Having considered some battles again, and looked closely (again) at one or two, I'm finding it hard trying to decide how we would find evidence of this sort of thing, and if we did what it would mean. Just because something's official it doesn't make it right. It does seem entirely likely that they existed in some form, and Procopius himself might have composed some for Justinian. If that's true, he probably did use them - maybe it was in his capacity as writer of official reports that he decided to compose the Wars?
Anyway, lots of interesting things being uncovered (to my mind), with many more to follow. This also happens to be raising, at least in my mind, interesting questions about composition. More to come...
One of the first things that I did was evaluate, or consider, those instances where Procopius, the historical figure, intervened himself in the action, whether it was to provide advice about trumpets, get some intel from Sicily, or scope out some supply routes (and the supplies themselves) for the Romans. He doesn't intervene too often, though when he does he evinces some knowledge and experience with military stuff.
More recently I've turned to campaign reports and bulletins, and oral sources. I've been engaged in some TLG searches with a few choice words and phrases, and they have turned up some interesting results. There are, for instance, far more references to specific spearmen (doryphoroi) and shield-bearers (hypaspistes) than I had appreciated before, and possibly more than there should be given their relative numbers. I had wondered if this was, in part, due to their increased usage - and the connections with buccellarii, Procopius' experiences, and Belisarius' wealth might bear this out - in sixth century combat. But, I've also noticed that it is invariably the spearmen who are mentioned rather than the shield bearers. Not unusual in and of itself - all classical and classicizing (or just about) authors and theorists advocate attention be focused on the elite - though it's definitely something that's worth exploring. I can certainly appreciate why some see these men as the ones who gave Procopius much of his information.
I should add, on the subject of oral sources I'm also taking a look at Procopius' usage of words like phasi. Has a good pedigree, of course. What's stuck me so far is how much he uses it in what I consider the Herodotean parts of the Wars: books 1, 2 and 8 - the majority of usages are found there. This too might not be a coincidence, given, if I recall (off the top of my head) Herodotus' practices.
Bulletins and reports are a tougher nut to crack. None of these survive, save a possible example in the Chronicon Paschale. We also lack all those strength reports from the earlier empire, which seem to hint at some sort of record keeping of this sort, at least to my mind. Having considered some battles again, and looked closely (again) at one or two, I'm finding it hard trying to decide how we would find evidence of this sort of thing, and if we did what it would mean. Just because something's official it doesn't make it right. It does seem entirely likely that they existed in some form, and Procopius himself might have composed some for Justinian. If that's true, he probably did use them - maybe it was in his capacity as writer of official reports that he decided to compose the Wars?
Anyway, lots of interesting things being uncovered (to my mind), with many more to follow. This also happens to be raising, at least in my mind, interesting questions about composition. More to come...
Monday 22 September 2014
Military Bulletins in Late Antiquity
Two of the major projects that I'm working on at the moment are on Procopius. One of them, as alluded to in an earlier post, will present some sort of evaluation of Procopius as a military historian. Or maybe as a source for war is better (2 works aren't histories). In this project more than the other Procopius one (culture and combat in the Wars), I'll be delving into his sources, so pseudo-oldschool Quellenkritik and the like.
What were Procopius' sources? Well, in good Thucydidean and Polybian fashion, he had the benefit of experience, and had even seen firsthand much of the military material that he described. While it's true that firsthand and eye-witness shouldn't be equated with the reliability of his material, it certainly helps. So, Procopius had his own experiences and reports (in whatever form they took) to work with. Being there, and getting to know the officers, and hypothetically even some of the men (though would a man like Procopius with, perhaps, great expectations want to mingle with the regular soldiers?), meant that he and the opportunity both then and afterwards to interview these participants. It's likely he used them too.
As scholars have long recognized, however, he also had to deal with those conflicts and military things for which he had no firsthand experience or account. What did he use in those instances? Well, perhaps the military dispatch/report/bulletin, that have been discussed for other authors (Malalas, Menander ProtectorTheophylact and the Chronicon Paschale) and periods (middle Byzantine). Could he have used these? Perhaps. The frustrating thing with respect to these official reports, though with any of the evidence that he used, is that there is no virtually no way of proving unequivocally what he used. Classicizing historians tend not to name their sources, and Procopius is no different. On the other hand, for a number of reasons he seems likely to have used something. So what about these dispatches?
Greatrex suggested that these might have been housed in facilities not only in Constantinople but also in Antioch at the HQ for the Comes Orientis. Procopius could easily have accessed them, particularly those in Constantinople, especially if we are right to think Procopius spent the last bit (however long that might have been) of his life in the capital. However his life might have panned out, it seems likely he could have found a way to access these if need be.
What form would these bulletins take? Guess that depends, in part, on what the government might have wanted to make a record of and, indeed, some of the entries in late antique and early medieval chronicles are suggestive. Essentially the basics: the whos, whats, wheres, whens, and maybe less likely the hows and whys of a campaigns. The whys might, more often than not, be left for the historians to discuss, or the inquiries launched when things go wrong. Would they have kept them for each and every campaign? Would it depend on the particular emperor or even his staff? We have hints at some possible examples of these: Heraclius' letter from Azerbaijan reporting on military matters in 628. Caesar's Gallic Wars might also evoke (or be indicative of?) these sorts of things - though in the latter case they would seem to be quite detailed.
More to come...
What were Procopius' sources? Well, in good Thucydidean and Polybian fashion, he had the benefit of experience, and had even seen firsthand much of the military material that he described. While it's true that firsthand and eye-witness shouldn't be equated with the reliability of his material, it certainly helps. So, Procopius had his own experiences and reports (in whatever form they took) to work with. Being there, and getting to know the officers, and hypothetically even some of the men (though would a man like Procopius with, perhaps, great expectations want to mingle with the regular soldiers?), meant that he and the opportunity both then and afterwards to interview these participants. It's likely he used them too.
As scholars have long recognized, however, he also had to deal with those conflicts and military things for which he had no firsthand experience or account. What did he use in those instances? Well, perhaps the military dispatch/report/bulletin, that have been discussed for other authors (Malalas, Menander ProtectorTheophylact and the Chronicon Paschale) and periods (middle Byzantine). Could he have used these? Perhaps. The frustrating thing with respect to these official reports, though with any of the evidence that he used, is that there is no virtually no way of proving unequivocally what he used. Classicizing historians tend not to name their sources, and Procopius is no different. On the other hand, for a number of reasons he seems likely to have used something. So what about these dispatches?
Greatrex suggested that these might have been housed in facilities not only in Constantinople but also in Antioch at the HQ for the Comes Orientis. Procopius could easily have accessed them, particularly those in Constantinople, especially if we are right to think Procopius spent the last bit (however long that might have been) of his life in the capital. However his life might have panned out, it seems likely he could have found a way to access these if need be.
What form would these bulletins take? Guess that depends, in part, on what the government might have wanted to make a record of and, indeed, some of the entries in late antique and early medieval chronicles are suggestive. Essentially the basics: the whos, whats, wheres, whens, and maybe less likely the hows and whys of a campaigns. The whys might, more often than not, be left for the historians to discuss, or the inquiries launched when things go wrong. Would they have kept them for each and every campaign? Would it depend on the particular emperor or even his staff? We have hints at some possible examples of these: Heraclius' letter from Azerbaijan reporting on military matters in 628. Caesar's Gallic Wars might also evoke (or be indicative of?) these sorts of things - though in the latter case they would seem to be quite detailed.
More to come...
Friday 1 August 2014
How Bad is Agathias? Experiencing War in the Sixth Century
I've been reading bits of Agathias for a chapter on women and warfare in Procopius - and really running with the thin/thick descriptions, which I had erroneously attributed to Levithan (actually found it in Petersen's massive new book on siege warfare in late antiquity, and it ultimately goes back to Geertz and anthropology). Anyway, I'm a Procopius lover, though I've had a soft spot (as one does) for Agathias too. I've engaged a little both with Agathias here and there, and have always had plans of doing more, but it's not quite worked out...perhaps soon.
Anyway, although Kaldellis has made some forceful arguments for the quality of Agathias' historical achievements, and though Syvanne is generally positive of some of his military accounts, many would place him low down the historian leaderboard. For some reasons, this might very well be a fair assessment. Given I've been looking at war, I'm wondering if it's not a little unfair. As wonderful as Procopius is, much of his descriptions are shorn of the "face of battle" style that Kagan (2006) has attributed to Ammianus (think Amida). Indeed, when Procopius bothers to mention women in accounts of warfare, his mentions are usually restricted to the inevitable (from an historiographical perspective - I'm not trying to downplay the horrors of these actions) enslaving of women and children. Now, I haven't gotten to the siege of Rome yet (537ish), and my memory is a bit rusty, so there may be more there.
Nevertheless, I read Ps.-Joshua's account and, well, as I already knew, he spends a considerable amount of time on the experience of war, particularly with respect to the siege of Edessa around 504 (is it later? - not sure off the top of my head). Good stuff, few of the classicizing topoi, and generally a vivid account of the experience of siege warfare from the perspective from those on the inside - though there's much of value in general.
Where does Agathias fit in? Well, he's next on the list, and as I've been perusing (and really only perusing) the Histories, I've been struck by the care with which he composed his accounts of warfare. I know he's a poetic historian. He does have a penchant for verbosity, and some of his descriptions are long-winded - reading about a coiling-elephant trunk and a stampede in the Greek was a painful (but pleasurable too) exercise. And yes, his lack of first-hand experience has inevitably meant that he's had to fall back on topoi, stereotypes, and the like to compose his accounts. Yet, while there is a certain consistency from account to account, there is still considerable variety, and this most superficial of readings is leaving me with the impression that his verbose and literary treatment of warfare conveys much better than Procopius does the experience of warfare. His ekphrases, then, seem to be much more effective at brining the warfare before the eyes of me, the reader. More needs to be done, but he's given me much to ponder.
Anyway, although Kaldellis has made some forceful arguments for the quality of Agathias' historical achievements, and though Syvanne is generally positive of some of his military accounts, many would place him low down the historian leaderboard. For some reasons, this might very well be a fair assessment. Given I've been looking at war, I'm wondering if it's not a little unfair. As wonderful as Procopius is, much of his descriptions are shorn of the "face of battle" style that Kagan (2006) has attributed to Ammianus (think Amida). Indeed, when Procopius bothers to mention women in accounts of warfare, his mentions are usually restricted to the inevitable (from an historiographical perspective - I'm not trying to downplay the horrors of these actions) enslaving of women and children. Now, I haven't gotten to the siege of Rome yet (537ish), and my memory is a bit rusty, so there may be more there.
Nevertheless, I read Ps.-Joshua's account and, well, as I already knew, he spends a considerable amount of time on the experience of war, particularly with respect to the siege of Edessa around 504 (is it later? - not sure off the top of my head). Good stuff, few of the classicizing topoi, and generally a vivid account of the experience of siege warfare from the perspective from those on the inside - though there's much of value in general.
Where does Agathias fit in? Well, he's next on the list, and as I've been perusing (and really only perusing) the Histories, I've been struck by the care with which he composed his accounts of warfare. I know he's a poetic historian. He does have a penchant for verbosity, and some of his descriptions are long-winded - reading about a coiling-elephant trunk and a stampede in the Greek was a painful (but pleasurable too) exercise. And yes, his lack of first-hand experience has inevitably meant that he's had to fall back on topoi, stereotypes, and the like to compose his accounts. Yet, while there is a certain consistency from account to account, there is still considerable variety, and this most superficial of readings is leaving me with the impression that his verbose and literary treatment of warfare conveys much better than Procopius does the experience of warfare. His ekphrases, then, seem to be much more effective at brining the warfare before the eyes of me, the reader. More needs to be done, but he's given me much to ponder.
Friday 18 July 2014
Tracking Roman Combat Fatalities, or How to Use the Evidence
I've been reading some of Ian Morris' wide-ranging work, including his new book on war. It's got me thinking about a lot of things; one in particular is death in combat. If we wanted to know if Rome was doing better or worse at war, one ostensibly, simple way to do this would be to take a look at death rates among soldiers (let alone civilians) in combat over the course of Rome's documented history. So, if we're talking about using reliable accounts, that would mean, most likely, using everyone from Polybius to Theophylact (my cutoff for Rome being in the mid seventh century - and really my choice is just as arbitrary as anyone else's). Sure, there are narrative accounts for earlier periods, but given the questions pre-Polybius, not to mention issues with Dionysius and Diodorus. Best leave those out. Although that doesn't provide a complete list, it does give us some solid thick descriptions (here I'm borrowing terminology from Levithan's Roman Siege Warfare) of battle over the course of a considerable amount of time.
Ideally we'd like to use official records, but short of the occasional document like Hunt's Pridianum, or select Vindolanda tablets, we don't have what could be called official records of fatalities. And, that's not to say that those aforementioned documents are official themselves. And we're assuming that they had them to begin with. Given the general, and occasionally detailed, image we have of Roman military organization it seems unlikely to me that they didn't have some sort of record. Heck, even the list of names from the monument in Romania (not the Adamklissi one - name escapes me and this IS a blog post so I'm not going to check) points in that direction. But, as I say, we got nothing.
Archaeological data from sites of battle would be useful too, but we have almost nothing in this regard. The penchant for collecting and burying the dead, not to mention the pillaging of lost weapons by Romans and their foes alike has meant that we haven't found much of this, besides problems with tracking down the specific sites of individual battles. They did eventually find the site of Varus' last stand, and some remarkable stuff was recovered, but outside, say, the remains of Dura (and we're talking a siege here - and I have blurred the line so far), we haven't much to go on. In fact, even less of this than we have of the official record sort. What remains, then, are the accounts in the aforementioned historians themselves.
If we wanted some sort of control on our data, we might only consider those historians who fall within the classical or classicizing tradition, and so describe history - and for us war and battle - in a conscribed sort of way (speeches, digressions, etc.). This would mean using writers like Josephus (Jewish War), Herodian, and Ammianus, but not those like Josephus (Jewish Antiquities), Eusebius, and Count Marcellinus. We'd probably have to include Caesar too, even if he doesn't quite fit the mould, though he is similar. There are, unsurprisingly, problems with using a sample like this. Indeed, there are significant gaps during the period in question, not covered by these sorts of historians. Plus, even those that do survive describe battle in varying ways and in varying quantities. Their credentials too vary quite a lot.
Of course, it's clear that this attempt at control starts to falter quite soon too. There are too many gaps, many of which are filled by other historians working within different traditions. This does likely mean that they approach evidence and shape their narratives (if a narrative it is) in quite different ways - and hold different events and details of different worth than the classical and classicizing ones, though by the end of antiquity the lines had really started to blur. Still, it would probably be in our best interests to use as many different historians as possible, despite the glaring lack of consistency, and as along as we're sensitive to the vagaries of the various authors we should be ok...should be.
Now that we've established that we would use the various ancient historians (and anything literary that might be of value) and we feel "extremely" (read sarcastically) confident about that, we have to take a look at what sorts of figures they use. Some give precise figures ("612", some give vague figures ("no less than 1000", some use general phrases ("many died"), and some give widely fanciful ones ("70,000", or it could be read in some cases of "70 myriads" - which to me is less a real number than it is a vague generalization) - and some times the historians use all manner of figure. Of course, sometimes they give nothing, or only give it for one side only, and not the Roman side. If we look at chronicle (or chronograph - however you want to call them) accounts, sometimes we have little more than figures, and no sense of context. In fact, the closer you look the less ideal this evidence appears. None of this is really new, but to my mind it's still worth stressing.
So, what do we do? Do we discard this too? That would mean we're left with nothing - and there is no way to look at changing death rates amongst soldiers over the course of Rome's history. Sure, I could have mentioned inscriptions, but those are really only useful for a couple of centuries, and even then of the many dead soldiers recorded, few (so far as I know off the top of my head) come from combat itself. Rather, the epitaph was usually erected later in life. Even if it proved useful for at least some areas of the empire, it's no good to us for the republican period, or the late roman period. Ultimately, still nothing.
Maybe, however, this is the point. We don't have the sorts of data that we like, and the last thing we should try to do is to make it fit into any preconceived plans or theories. If we don't have the evidence, we don't have evidence, and we should leave it at that. Problem is, we do have some evidence, and as wretched as it might at a sweeping glance seem, I think it behoves us to use it. As long as we're all aware of what we're doing and what we're using, and as long as we don't make attempts to apply whatever results we have too widely, and we are careful and methodical as much as we can be when using it, then it is worth using. For, though it might not tell us give us the exact evidence we want, it's possible it might give us some sense of the rate of fatalities amongst Roman soldiers in combat over time. Then, if we used that in conjunction with other evidence (wins, losses, territorial gains, losses, etc.), we might go some way towards getting a better idea just how well the Roman military actually fared over time, particularly in late antiquity.
Ideally we'd like to use official records, but short of the occasional document like Hunt's Pridianum, or select Vindolanda tablets, we don't have what could be called official records of fatalities. And, that's not to say that those aforementioned documents are official themselves. And we're assuming that they had them to begin with. Given the general, and occasionally detailed, image we have of Roman military organization it seems unlikely to me that they didn't have some sort of record. Heck, even the list of names from the monument in Romania (not the Adamklissi one - name escapes me and this IS a blog post so I'm not going to check) points in that direction. But, as I say, we got nothing.
Archaeological data from sites of battle would be useful too, but we have almost nothing in this regard. The penchant for collecting and burying the dead, not to mention the pillaging of lost weapons by Romans and their foes alike has meant that we haven't found much of this, besides problems with tracking down the specific sites of individual battles. They did eventually find the site of Varus' last stand, and some remarkable stuff was recovered, but outside, say, the remains of Dura (and we're talking a siege here - and I have blurred the line so far), we haven't much to go on. In fact, even less of this than we have of the official record sort. What remains, then, are the accounts in the aforementioned historians themselves.
If we wanted some sort of control on our data, we might only consider those historians who fall within the classical or classicizing tradition, and so describe history - and for us war and battle - in a conscribed sort of way (speeches, digressions, etc.). This would mean using writers like Josephus (Jewish War), Herodian, and Ammianus, but not those like Josephus (Jewish Antiquities), Eusebius, and Count Marcellinus. We'd probably have to include Caesar too, even if he doesn't quite fit the mould, though he is similar. There are, unsurprisingly, problems with using a sample like this. Indeed, there are significant gaps during the period in question, not covered by these sorts of historians. Plus, even those that do survive describe battle in varying ways and in varying quantities. Their credentials too vary quite a lot.
Of course, it's clear that this attempt at control starts to falter quite soon too. There are too many gaps, many of which are filled by other historians working within different traditions. This does likely mean that they approach evidence and shape their narratives (if a narrative it is) in quite different ways - and hold different events and details of different worth than the classical and classicizing ones, though by the end of antiquity the lines had really started to blur. Still, it would probably be in our best interests to use as many different historians as possible, despite the glaring lack of consistency, and as along as we're sensitive to the vagaries of the various authors we should be ok...should be.
Now that we've established that we would use the various ancient historians (and anything literary that might be of value) and we feel "extremely" (read sarcastically) confident about that, we have to take a look at what sorts of figures they use. Some give precise figures ("612", some give vague figures ("no less than 1000", some use general phrases ("many died"), and some give widely fanciful ones ("70,000", or it could be read in some cases of "70 myriads" - which to me is less a real number than it is a vague generalization) - and some times the historians use all manner of figure. Of course, sometimes they give nothing, or only give it for one side only, and not the Roman side. If we look at chronicle (or chronograph - however you want to call them) accounts, sometimes we have little more than figures, and no sense of context. In fact, the closer you look the less ideal this evidence appears. None of this is really new, but to my mind it's still worth stressing.
So, what do we do? Do we discard this too? That would mean we're left with nothing - and there is no way to look at changing death rates amongst soldiers over the course of Rome's history. Sure, I could have mentioned inscriptions, but those are really only useful for a couple of centuries, and even then of the many dead soldiers recorded, few (so far as I know off the top of my head) come from combat itself. Rather, the epitaph was usually erected later in life. Even if it proved useful for at least some areas of the empire, it's no good to us for the republican period, or the late roman period. Ultimately, still nothing.
Maybe, however, this is the point. We don't have the sorts of data that we like, and the last thing we should try to do is to make it fit into any preconceived plans or theories. If we don't have the evidence, we don't have evidence, and we should leave it at that. Problem is, we do have some evidence, and as wretched as it might at a sweeping glance seem, I think it behoves us to use it. As long as we're all aware of what we're doing and what we're using, and as long as we don't make attempts to apply whatever results we have too widely, and we are careful and methodical as much as we can be when using it, then it is worth using. For, though it might not tell us give us the exact evidence we want, it's possible it might give us some sense of the rate of fatalities amongst Roman soldiers in combat over time. Then, if we used that in conjunction with other evidence (wins, losses, territorial gains, losses, etc.), we might go some way towards getting a better idea just how well the Roman military actually fared over time, particularly in late antiquity.
The Changing Face of Classical Warfare
How much did warfare change between Classical Athens and Sixth Century East Rome? And if it did was it an improvement? Was there anything that could be considered a revolution? Some say there have been a number of military revolutions (er - that's revolutions in the ways of war, rather than, say, the replacement of one ruler by another) at various points, other just a few. Had matters improved to such a degree by the sixth century that an east Roman army would annihilate a band of Athenian hoplites had they jumped forward in time some 1000 years?
The most obvious answer is probably yes. After all, the hoplite armies of late classical Greece had been defeated, quite significantly, by those of Philip, Alexander, and Macedonia. In turn, those same Macedonian armies had been defeated, in time, by the Roman armies, and again quite significantly. So, if the sixth century east Roman army was an offshoot of the earlier one that had been so successful, then it would stand to reason that yes, they would be successful, and so things had improved.
But was there anything that could be called revolutionary in the changes that had taken place? There was no gunpowder, or air power. Even the stirrup wasn't quite there yet. What about changes in artillery: do they count? Perhaps, but did victories in sieges ultimately lead to success in war? The Romans had a lot of success, but so did the Persians - and they eventually lost out. Perhaps if there was a revolution it was less in the area of the methods of fighting than in the organizations that emerged instead. The Roman armies were famously professional - eventually - and the greater flexibility of their units allowed them to run circles around their foes. Polybius describes something to this effect in his Histories when he's describing the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion (which in his day was filled with cohorts rather than centuries, which came a bit later). Sarantis (2013) has argued that Roman success in late antiquity rested in another aspect of organization - their infrastructure, from the series of well-fortified sites across the frontiers to the well-planned logistical networks and systems. So maybe the revolution, or revolutions, was less in the way of war than in the means of enabling it.
Much of our evidence for combat, of course, comes from literary sources, and their take on things can muddy the waters to no insignificant degree. To my mind one of the most stark examples of this is Procopius' descriptions of combat in his Wars. For Procopius is effectively describing war in the language, manner, and style of Thucydides, even though Thuydides is dealing with hoplites and Procopius late Roman soldiers. Even more surprising - and problematic - than this is his "famous" comparison in the preface between Homeric archers and the horse archers of his day. Scholars have wrangled over what Procopius is saying: legitimate discussion, playful and subtle criticism of contemporary practice, or the presentation of some sort of ideal. Whatever he had in mind, it's worth considering that he did see fit to make this comparison in the first place, and his relative success as a writer suggests it had some currency. Is this just a case of the baffling ineptness of Procopius and some members of his audience? In some real sense did they really think that you could compare the warfare waged 1000 years (and more - even 1500) earlier with that of his own day? Had some actually criticized the present-day soldiers in light of those earlier ones?
But maybe we are missing something - maybe war really hadn't changed all that much. Yes, Roman legions had crushed Macedonian phalanges/phalanxes, but if Alexander had lived a little later, and/or the two met a bit earlier, would the phalanx still have been bested by Roman might? I think that question is harder to answer.
Ultimately, a satisfactory answer would take a lot more time and space than the length of this blog and the amount of time it took me to write this. But, if warfare didn't change all that much, at least during the classical age (and you might say Homer and Procopius fall outside it, to some degree, at least when we're concerned with warfare, and so the notes about them are misleading), that Procopius, for instance, did see fit to describe war in the manner that he did might not have been as foolhardy as it might seem on the surface.
The most obvious answer is probably yes. After all, the hoplite armies of late classical Greece had been defeated, quite significantly, by those of Philip, Alexander, and Macedonia. In turn, those same Macedonian armies had been defeated, in time, by the Roman armies, and again quite significantly. So, if the sixth century east Roman army was an offshoot of the earlier one that had been so successful, then it would stand to reason that yes, they would be successful, and so things had improved.
But was there anything that could be called revolutionary in the changes that had taken place? There was no gunpowder, or air power. Even the stirrup wasn't quite there yet. What about changes in artillery: do they count? Perhaps, but did victories in sieges ultimately lead to success in war? The Romans had a lot of success, but so did the Persians - and they eventually lost out. Perhaps if there was a revolution it was less in the area of the methods of fighting than in the organizations that emerged instead. The Roman armies were famously professional - eventually - and the greater flexibility of their units allowed them to run circles around their foes. Polybius describes something to this effect in his Histories when he's describing the Macedonian phalanx and the Roman legion (which in his day was filled with cohorts rather than centuries, which came a bit later). Sarantis (2013) has argued that Roman success in late antiquity rested in another aspect of organization - their infrastructure, from the series of well-fortified sites across the frontiers to the well-planned logistical networks and systems. So maybe the revolution, or revolutions, was less in the way of war than in the means of enabling it.
Much of our evidence for combat, of course, comes from literary sources, and their take on things can muddy the waters to no insignificant degree. To my mind one of the most stark examples of this is Procopius' descriptions of combat in his Wars. For Procopius is effectively describing war in the language, manner, and style of Thucydides, even though Thuydides is dealing with hoplites and Procopius late Roman soldiers. Even more surprising - and problematic - than this is his "famous" comparison in the preface between Homeric archers and the horse archers of his day. Scholars have wrangled over what Procopius is saying: legitimate discussion, playful and subtle criticism of contemporary practice, or the presentation of some sort of ideal. Whatever he had in mind, it's worth considering that he did see fit to make this comparison in the first place, and his relative success as a writer suggests it had some currency. Is this just a case of the baffling ineptness of Procopius and some members of his audience? In some real sense did they really think that you could compare the warfare waged 1000 years (and more - even 1500) earlier with that of his own day? Had some actually criticized the present-day soldiers in light of those earlier ones?
But maybe we are missing something - maybe war really hadn't changed all that much. Yes, Roman legions had crushed Macedonian phalanges/phalanxes, but if Alexander had lived a little later, and/or the two met a bit earlier, would the phalanx still have been bested by Roman might? I think that question is harder to answer.
Ultimately, a satisfactory answer would take a lot more time and space than the length of this blog and the amount of time it took me to write this. But, if warfare didn't change all that much, at least during the classical age (and you might say Homer and Procopius fall outside it, to some degree, at least when we're concerned with warfare, and so the notes about them are misleading), that Procopius, for instance, did see fit to describe war in the manner that he did might not have been as foolhardy as it might seem on the surface.
Wednesday 16 July 2014
What Makes a Good Ancient(etc.) Military History Part 3: Procopius' Art of War
As I was saying about more time...
There were a number of ways to describe war in the sixth century and Procopius simply opted with the most tried and true of approaches. Indeed, one of the greatest aspects of the sixth century is the many ways available to describe both the more recent and the more distant past - and the number of different aspects of those pasts that were described. It was no longer simply war and politics. Nevertheless, that's what I'm interested here.
So, however we might characterize Procopius' way of war, it's also worth asking whose it is? Is it his alone? Those of the wider sixth century in general? This is important, for it has some bearing on the evaluation of his worth as a military historian (or war reporter). There are other historians who described some of the same events that he did, such as Malalas, John Lydus, and Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite. Many consider Malalas to represent the official view, though he's not terribly interested in the minutiae of sixth century warfare, with few exceptions - and many (though not me) would argue that what we have is little more than mishmash of other sources. John Lydus' history is lost, though that he was apparently commissioned to write a history of sorts of Justinian's war/wars is worth noting. Pseudo-Joshua was writing a bit earlier, and his worldview is not quite that of the classicizing Procopius: it makes for a refreshing comparative. With that said, a cursory glances suggests that his worldview is more likely that of the Romano-Persian borderlands than that of the core of the empire in Constantinople and environs.
Still, that doesn't help us with Procopius. If his views are idiosyncratic - those of him alone - then it would be more than a little misleading to characterize his approach to warfare as the "Byzantine Way of War", the "Late Roman Way of War", "the East Roman Way of War", or what have you.
Whosever views we think Procopius presents, it's also true that he makes for a complex case because of the quantity of his surviving work, and the sheer variety of what he does include. On the one hand, he presents a host of rulers, from Persian shahs to Roman emperors. The central emperor, Justinian, features occasionally, at least explicitly, in the Wars, though has a much more central role in the Buildings and Secret History. Plus, from a military perspective (though from other perspectives too), the image of Justinian that he presents is obtuse, at least if we use all three texts - and I think we should. In the SH we have an emperor whose foreign policy decisions undermined the security of the state, thanks in part to his willingness to use what seem to be less than desirable means of achieving his desired ends - i.e., he pays of barbarians and under-funds the very soldiery on whose safety the empire depends. In the Buildings, the emperor's construction work led, amongst other things, to what could be called an unprecedented level of security of the empire and its citizenry. Indeed, the emperor of that panegyrical text is - or at this point in my research seems to be - very much a defensively-minded one, which would seem to mesh with how some characterize the general Byzantine strategic mentality. In the Wars, in sharp contrast to his adversaries, Justinian doesn't campaign in person, and the warfare that's described is a mixture of the defensive against Persia, though the Romans do attack on occasion;, the offensive (how else ought we characterize the wars in Africa and Italy than as wars of aggression?; and asymmetric, if we go back to Africa and the unrest that arose after the initial lightning-quick conquest. We also get some insight, particularly in the build-up to the African invasion, of the foreign policy decision making at the court of Justinian.
Even the combat described is varied - Persian combat is in many ways unlike Vandal combat, which is also in many ways unlike Gothic combat. And, all this is to say nothing about the little-mentioned Balkan combat that he all but excludes. Sure, cavalry is described, and there are some well-known discussions of horse archers, but infantry features too, there is plenty of siege warfare, and let's not forget the asymmetric combat. Some Romans (or East Romans or Byzantines if you prefer) demonstrate predilections for what some call the western way of war - direct assaults on the enemy. Other Romans prefer what some call the eastern approach - fight at last resort. Indeed, in some ways this is the problem of Byzantine history in general - in the minds of many it lands somewhere between east and west: more eastern than western to medievalists, and perhaps more western than eastern to orientalists.
Anyway, if there's any point yet it's simply that there's much to consider.
There were a number of ways to describe war in the sixth century and Procopius simply opted with the most tried and true of approaches. Indeed, one of the greatest aspects of the sixth century is the many ways available to describe both the more recent and the more distant past - and the number of different aspects of those pasts that were described. It was no longer simply war and politics. Nevertheless, that's what I'm interested here.
So, however we might characterize Procopius' way of war, it's also worth asking whose it is? Is it his alone? Those of the wider sixth century in general? This is important, for it has some bearing on the evaluation of his worth as a military historian (or war reporter). There are other historians who described some of the same events that he did, such as Malalas, John Lydus, and Pseudo-Joshua the Stylite. Many consider Malalas to represent the official view, though he's not terribly interested in the minutiae of sixth century warfare, with few exceptions - and many (though not me) would argue that what we have is little more than mishmash of other sources. John Lydus' history is lost, though that he was apparently commissioned to write a history of sorts of Justinian's war/wars is worth noting. Pseudo-Joshua was writing a bit earlier, and his worldview is not quite that of the classicizing Procopius: it makes for a refreshing comparative. With that said, a cursory glances suggests that his worldview is more likely that of the Romano-Persian borderlands than that of the core of the empire in Constantinople and environs.
Still, that doesn't help us with Procopius. If his views are idiosyncratic - those of him alone - then it would be more than a little misleading to characterize his approach to warfare as the "Byzantine Way of War", the "Late Roman Way of War", "the East Roman Way of War", or what have you.
Whosever views we think Procopius presents, it's also true that he makes for a complex case because of the quantity of his surviving work, and the sheer variety of what he does include. On the one hand, he presents a host of rulers, from Persian shahs to Roman emperors. The central emperor, Justinian, features occasionally, at least explicitly, in the Wars, though has a much more central role in the Buildings and Secret History. Plus, from a military perspective (though from other perspectives too), the image of Justinian that he presents is obtuse, at least if we use all three texts - and I think we should. In the SH we have an emperor whose foreign policy decisions undermined the security of the state, thanks in part to his willingness to use what seem to be less than desirable means of achieving his desired ends - i.e., he pays of barbarians and under-funds the very soldiery on whose safety the empire depends. In the Buildings, the emperor's construction work led, amongst other things, to what could be called an unprecedented level of security of the empire and its citizenry. Indeed, the emperor of that panegyrical text is - or at this point in my research seems to be - very much a defensively-minded one, which would seem to mesh with how some characterize the general Byzantine strategic mentality. In the Wars, in sharp contrast to his adversaries, Justinian doesn't campaign in person, and the warfare that's described is a mixture of the defensive against Persia, though the Romans do attack on occasion;, the offensive (how else ought we characterize the wars in Africa and Italy than as wars of aggression?; and asymmetric, if we go back to Africa and the unrest that arose after the initial lightning-quick conquest. We also get some insight, particularly in the build-up to the African invasion, of the foreign policy decision making at the court of Justinian.
Even the combat described is varied - Persian combat is in many ways unlike Vandal combat, which is also in many ways unlike Gothic combat. And, all this is to say nothing about the little-mentioned Balkan combat that he all but excludes. Sure, cavalry is described, and there are some well-known discussions of horse archers, but infantry features too, there is plenty of siege warfare, and let's not forget the asymmetric combat. Some Romans (or East Romans or Byzantines if you prefer) demonstrate predilections for what some call the western way of war - direct assaults on the enemy. Other Romans prefer what some call the eastern approach - fight at last resort. Indeed, in some ways this is the problem of Byzantine history in general - in the minds of many it lands somewhere between east and west: more eastern than western to medievalists, and perhaps more western than eastern to orientalists.
Anyway, if there's any point yet it's simply that there's much to consider.
What Makes a Good Ancient/Late Antique/Medieval Historian Part 2
More time means more thinking.
So, one of the issues, or at least a matter that has been raised about Procopius - and you could argue widely accepted - is his status as a topnotch reporter, but less so a top historian (Cameron 1985, essentially). As noted, my focus is on military history in particular, and so for me I've framed this particular dichotomy, one which the book will address, is whether Procopius is a topnotch war reported or a top notch military historian - or various shades of grey.
The thinking, so far as I understand it, is that if he's simply a top reporter, then his account is more valuable for what it describes than how he explains what he describes. Thucydides, famously, not only provides one of the most vivid accounts of war from any age, but one of the most penetrating historical analyses as well - and, it is probably fair to say that Procopius doesn't quite hit that mark. But does he only describe? I'm convinced that, at least with respect to combat, he doesn't. In fact, there are all sorts of explanations that he includes in the bulk of his descriptions, and even in those brief notices. But, to my mind it stands to reason that if he explains combat, both implicitly and explicitly, then he probably explains a lot more, even if the analysis itself isn't as penetrating as we might like it to be. That might mean that he has recourse to the divine and morality, which might not be what we'd like (though that in itself is interesting from a cultural perspective), but I do believe it's there - though if it's not, I'll note that too.
Procopius certainly presents a wide variety of the experiences of war, and even some of those of the lower echelons of society, even if they are sometimes little more than vague references and compilations of cliches, dare I say. Indeed, there's no doubt in my mind that his coverage is extensive. Procopius provides information on the planning for war, at both the highest levels and in the field. He discusses some of the logistics of war, both directly and indirectly, from his manifold descriptions of fortifications in the buildings and the food problems experienced on the voyage to Africa, to the attempts of Belisarius himself to recruit men before heading back to Italy for the second time. There are also all those anecdotes - like his own (Procopius') foray into Sicily and the coast of Italy during the Gothic War.
One issue that could pose some problems is the lack of closure. Though parts of the Wars end in what are to my mind more reasonable places than most have assumed, in all cases, save maybe Africa to some degree or other, the wars hadn't finished by the time he'd finished. Indeed, even after he'd penned book 8 it wasn't all over. Yet, the same was true for Thucydides, or Polybius for that matter, and yet that hasn't stopped scholars from praising them.
So, more to come...
What Makes a Good Ancient/LateAntique/Medieval Military Historian?
How do you determine whether an ancient/late antique/medieval historian was a good one? What criteria should one use? Is there even such a thing as a good one? Heck, is it anachronistic to even consider ancient (etc.) historians if this was only part of what many of them did?
The reason I ask is that this has something to do with a project of mine looming on the horizon, and one I should be able to really get into within the next month or two. In this "year of Procopius", as I'm calling the next 12-14 months or so, one of the most significant things is an evaluation of Procopius as a military historian, something which hasn't attracted too much attention, or at least too much sustained, detailed attention. Sure, many have used him for late antique military matters, and so included some comments about his worth and the like, and there's even been a few essays, but nothing book length. Given that this is what I've set out to do (and plans and a possible/probable publisher are in place) I should really determine what that is.
I have already given the issue some thought. Another project, on Procopius and battle, is, I hope, nearing completion. That study is much more of a cultural reading of his approach to combat - I'm less interested there, at least explicitly, with whether or how we can use him for the realien of late antique military history - which is what this other project tackles. So, I do have a plan, or a tentative one, for how this ought to go. I'll include all three works, Wars, Secret History, and Buildings - they each have valuable evidence to offer, and to provide a full evaluation it would only make sense to cover all three. I've also been leaning towards dividing the project into at least three principal sections. One of the problems I'm having is I'm wondering this working plan is anachronistic - am I being guilty of the sorts of things that I'm saying we shouldn't do in this other project on combat?
The three sections I have in mind are: first, on strategy, which some would say is anachronistic for the pre-modern world, others wouldn't; the second, on operations, certainly mentioned and important - and some could argue even stressed, but a modern classification no less; and the third on tactics, the stuff at the battle level, where there would be some overlap with the previous project. I plan on rectifying the overlap problem by focusing in this new one more squarely on: "how can and should we use Procopius for military matters". Anyway, is this how I should be evaluating him, using our own terms? To some degree this is unavoidable - I am writing in English, after all . But if I shouldn't, then how should I do this? I guess you could look at the various ways that the ancients thought that war was won and lost, and we do, fortunately, have a good amount of evidence for this. I could then compare this with what Procopius has to say. Does he cover the same things? Would ancient readers approve of how he describes and explains war - and matters such as the role of God, Justinian, generalship, and whatever else?
Of course, maybe it need not be one or the other. There could be a first half that sets out Procopius' art of war (tentative title, I should add, is Procopius' Art of War), and which could cover all those issues that he does, from fortifications, siege engines, and technology, to disadvantaged frontier soldiers, multiethnic Roman armies, and questionable paying off of barbarian peoples. All those issues could fit under the broader category of war. Then, the second half could discuss how we use this. First, from a late antique operations standpoint, second, from a strategic standpoint, and third, from a tactical standpoint. If you do that, though, it would probably make sense to work in the former into the latter. Perhaps, then, it's not as problematic as I sometimes think it is.
Ultimately, the more I think about something, the more I doubt what had originally seemed so sensible. It's entirely plausible that I'll eventually go full circle and return right back to the original plan. But, plenty of time to work this out yet.
The reason I ask is that this has something to do with a project of mine looming on the horizon, and one I should be able to really get into within the next month or two. In this "year of Procopius", as I'm calling the next 12-14 months or so, one of the most significant things is an evaluation of Procopius as a military historian, something which hasn't attracted too much attention, or at least too much sustained, detailed attention. Sure, many have used him for late antique military matters, and so included some comments about his worth and the like, and there's even been a few essays, but nothing book length. Given that this is what I've set out to do (and plans and a possible/probable publisher are in place) I should really determine what that is.
I have already given the issue some thought. Another project, on Procopius and battle, is, I hope, nearing completion. That study is much more of a cultural reading of his approach to combat - I'm less interested there, at least explicitly, with whether or how we can use him for the realien of late antique military history - which is what this other project tackles. So, I do have a plan, or a tentative one, for how this ought to go. I'll include all three works, Wars, Secret History, and Buildings - they each have valuable evidence to offer, and to provide a full evaluation it would only make sense to cover all three. I've also been leaning towards dividing the project into at least three principal sections. One of the problems I'm having is I'm wondering this working plan is anachronistic - am I being guilty of the sorts of things that I'm saying we shouldn't do in this other project on combat?
The three sections I have in mind are: first, on strategy, which some would say is anachronistic for the pre-modern world, others wouldn't; the second, on operations, certainly mentioned and important - and some could argue even stressed, but a modern classification no less; and the third on tactics, the stuff at the battle level, where there would be some overlap with the previous project. I plan on rectifying the overlap problem by focusing in this new one more squarely on: "how can and should we use Procopius for military matters". Anyway, is this how I should be evaluating him, using our own terms? To some degree this is unavoidable - I am writing in English, after all . But if I shouldn't, then how should I do this? I guess you could look at the various ways that the ancients thought that war was won and lost, and we do, fortunately, have a good amount of evidence for this. I could then compare this with what Procopius has to say. Does he cover the same things? Would ancient readers approve of how he describes and explains war - and matters such as the role of God, Justinian, generalship, and whatever else?
Of course, maybe it need not be one or the other. There could be a first half that sets out Procopius' art of war (tentative title, I should add, is Procopius' Art of War), and which could cover all those issues that he does, from fortifications, siege engines, and technology, to disadvantaged frontier soldiers, multiethnic Roman armies, and questionable paying off of barbarian peoples. All those issues could fit under the broader category of war. Then, the second half could discuss how we use this. First, from a late antique operations standpoint, second, from a strategic standpoint, and third, from a tactical standpoint. If you do that, though, it would probably make sense to work in the former into the latter. Perhaps, then, it's not as problematic as I sometimes think it is.
Ultimately, the more I think about something, the more I doubt what had originally seemed so sensible. It's entirely plausible that I'll eventually go full circle and return right back to the original plan. But, plenty of time to work this out yet.
Saturday 15 February 2014
If the Late Roman Military Was a Sports Team: should the emperor/coach get fired?
Some time ago, while suffering through, and thinking about, the inconsistent performances of my favourite NHL team (the Ottawa Senators) and the local one (Winnipeg Jets), two things crossed my mind: first, what constitutes "a good record"; second, do - or even could or should - the criteria for sports team excellence apply to other phenomena? The other that I had in mind was the late Roman military, often either good or bad in modern estimations, with very few verdicts falling in between. If I took the general criteria for evaluating the success of a given team over the course of a season and applied it to the late Roman military how would it stack up? With this ridiculous idea and parallel in mind, I present this comparative approach to an evaluation of the late Roman military.
The criteria that I'm going to use are quite basic: how many wins are there and how many losses. This is the easiest way to compare sports to militaries: both win and lose. To make the analogy between then (late Rome) and now (modern North American sports), I've also decided to see how the military performs in different centuries, with the aim being to present a wider picture. I should note too that I've limited this discussion to wars agains external foes, for in civil war surely everyone's a loser from the Roman perspective. Any significant military activity (and I have been rather loose with respect to what counts) has been included, whether it's what could be considered a full-scale war or some sort of military campaign. Also, it's hardly an extensive list: I've only considered those wars listed in the back of volume 2 of the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. So, without further ado, here's late Rome's "performance": a preliminary investigation.
Wins-Losses-Draws 5-8-2
208-210 Septimius Severus in Scotland WIN
213-214 Caracalla against Alamanni WIN
215-216 Caracalla invades Parthia WIN
230-233 Alexander Severus campaigns against Persians DRAW
234-235 Alexander against Alamanni and Marcomanni - buys them off - DRAW
238 Persians attack eastern frontier - LOSS
243/244 Gordian defeated by Shapur I - LOSS
249/250 Goths raid Balkans - LOSS
251 Decius dies in battle against Goths - LOSS
260 Valerian captured by Persians - LOSS
260 Franks invade Gaul - LOSS
260 Alamanni invade Gaul - LOSS
262-267 Goths invade Asia Minor/Greece - LOSS
271 Aurelian defeats Palmyra - WIN
273 Aurelian reconquers Gaul - WIN
Wins-Losses-Draws 1-4-1
337-350 inconclusive war with Persia - DRAW
357 Julian defeats Alamanni - WIN
359 Shapur captures Amida - LOSS
361-363 Julian invades Persia - LOSS
378 Goths defeat & kill Valens - LOSS
396 Alaric & Goths ravage Greece - LOSS
Wins-Losses-Draws 0-6-1
410 sack of Rome - LOSS
429-439 Vandals take Africa - LOSS
440s Attila - DRAW
455 Vandals sack Rome - LOSS
460 Majorian's expedition to get Africa fails - LOSS
468 Basilicus' expedition to get Africa fails - LOSS
480s Goths overrun northern Balkans - LOSS
Wins-Losses-Draws 5-4-1
502-531 Rome wars with Persia - DRAW
533 Belisarius takes Africa - WIN
540 Belisarius takes Italy - WIN
540 Khusro attacks east - LOSS
544-552 Narses defeats Gothic resistance in Italy - WIN
568 Lombards invade Italy - LOSS
572 Justin II invades Persia - WIN
578/579 Avars start invasion of Balkans - LOSS
586/587 Slavs raid Greece - LOSS
590s Romans "win" in Balkans - WIN
Wins-Losses-Draws 1-2-0
614 Persians take much of east - LOSS
627 Heraclius defeats Persians at Nineveh - WIN
642 Arabs capture Alexandria - LOSS
Overall Wins-Losses-Draws 12-22-5
As noted, this is a far from thorough and extensive compilation of wars and wins/losses/draws and the like, and what has constituted for me a win or loss, or draw for that matter, has come down to a vaguely arbitrary decision. Still, a few comments - the evaluation portion - are in order.
Overall, the late Roman military (henceforth lrm) has a dismal record. In most north american sports leagues, or any for that matter, a 31% winning percentage isn't likely to lead to an extension of a coach's or manager's contract. That percentage puts them in the same rank as the Buffalo Sabres of this current NHL season (at 28% at the Olympic break - even worse remarkably). If we break it down by century, things look particularly grim in the third and fifth centuries, which is perhaps what we'd expect. So too, however, does the situation seem to be in the fourth, when most consider the lrm to have been performing at a reasonable level. In fact, it's the sixth century that the lrm does best, though a 56% winning percentage is nothing to write home about. Just ask the Jets; it's not going to get you into the playoffs. The record for the sixth century may not seem so dire either, though I stopped in the middle of that century.
There's at least one other way to look at these figures, however, at least if we look at the century by century breakdown: does the lrm win its last or most important battles/wars? If that's the criteria, then the third and sixth centuries again represent winning seasons: they've finished on top. Still, the records leave much to be desired.
In the end, a poor showing, though a more detailed complete would be far more helpful. So too would some additional comparative material, like Rome during the republican era and the early imperial one. Perhaps in another post...
The criteria that I'm going to use are quite basic: how many wins are there and how many losses. This is the easiest way to compare sports to militaries: both win and lose. To make the analogy between then (late Rome) and now (modern North American sports), I've also decided to see how the military performs in different centuries, with the aim being to present a wider picture. I should note too that I've limited this discussion to wars agains external foes, for in civil war surely everyone's a loser from the Roman perspective. Any significant military activity (and I have been rather loose with respect to what counts) has been included, whether it's what could be considered a full-scale war or some sort of military campaign. Also, it's hardly an extensive list: I've only considered those wars listed in the back of volume 2 of the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare. So, without further ado, here's late Rome's "performance": a preliminary investigation.
Wins-Losses-Draws 5-8-2
208-210 Septimius Severus in Scotland WIN
213-214 Caracalla against Alamanni WIN
215-216 Caracalla invades Parthia WIN
230-233 Alexander Severus campaigns against Persians DRAW
234-235 Alexander against Alamanni and Marcomanni - buys them off - DRAW
238 Persians attack eastern frontier - LOSS
243/244 Gordian defeated by Shapur I - LOSS
249/250 Goths raid Balkans - LOSS
251 Decius dies in battle against Goths - LOSS
260 Valerian captured by Persians - LOSS
260 Franks invade Gaul - LOSS
260 Alamanni invade Gaul - LOSS
262-267 Goths invade Asia Minor/Greece - LOSS
271 Aurelian defeats Palmyra - WIN
273 Aurelian reconquers Gaul - WIN
Wins-Losses-Draws 1-4-1
337-350 inconclusive war with Persia - DRAW
357 Julian defeats Alamanni - WIN
359 Shapur captures Amida - LOSS
361-363 Julian invades Persia - LOSS
378 Goths defeat & kill Valens - LOSS
396 Alaric & Goths ravage Greece - LOSS
Wins-Losses-Draws 0-6-1
410 sack of Rome - LOSS
429-439 Vandals take Africa - LOSS
440s Attila - DRAW
455 Vandals sack Rome - LOSS
460 Majorian's expedition to get Africa fails - LOSS
468 Basilicus' expedition to get Africa fails - LOSS
480s Goths overrun northern Balkans - LOSS
Wins-Losses-Draws 5-4-1
502-531 Rome wars with Persia - DRAW
533 Belisarius takes Africa - WIN
540 Belisarius takes Italy - WIN
540 Khusro attacks east - LOSS
544-552 Narses defeats Gothic resistance in Italy - WIN
568 Lombards invade Italy - LOSS
572 Justin II invades Persia - WIN
578/579 Avars start invasion of Balkans - LOSS
586/587 Slavs raid Greece - LOSS
590s Romans "win" in Balkans - WIN
Wins-Losses-Draws 1-2-0
614 Persians take much of east - LOSS
627 Heraclius defeats Persians at Nineveh - WIN
642 Arabs capture Alexandria - LOSS
Overall Wins-Losses-Draws 12-22-5
As noted, this is a far from thorough and extensive compilation of wars and wins/losses/draws and the like, and what has constituted for me a win or loss, or draw for that matter, has come down to a vaguely arbitrary decision. Still, a few comments - the evaluation portion - are in order.
Overall, the late Roman military (henceforth lrm) has a dismal record. In most north american sports leagues, or any for that matter, a 31% winning percentage isn't likely to lead to an extension of a coach's or manager's contract. That percentage puts them in the same rank as the Buffalo Sabres of this current NHL season (at 28% at the Olympic break - even worse remarkably). If we break it down by century, things look particularly grim in the third and fifth centuries, which is perhaps what we'd expect. So too, however, does the situation seem to be in the fourth, when most consider the lrm to have been performing at a reasonable level. In fact, it's the sixth century that the lrm does best, though a 56% winning percentage is nothing to write home about. Just ask the Jets; it's not going to get you into the playoffs. The record for the sixth century may not seem so dire either, though I stopped in the middle of that century.
There's at least one other way to look at these figures, however, at least if we look at the century by century breakdown: does the lrm win its last or most important battles/wars? If that's the criteria, then the third and sixth centuries again represent winning seasons: they've finished on top. Still, the records leave much to be desired.
In the end, a poor showing, though a more detailed complete would be far more helpful. So too would some additional comparative material, like Rome during the republican era and the early imperial one. Perhaps in another post...
Wednesday 12 February 2014
Need for Speed: in Defence of the Winter Olympics
A few days ago I read this http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/2014/02/07/10-objections-to-the-winter-olympics/, and it got me thinking about how the winter Olympics stack up to the summer ones. Obviously, being a Canadian and given that I'm sitting here looking out my window at the early stages of a 10-15cm snowfall, I'm a bit biased. Still, being human we all are, so on with the show. And, rather than write a rambling post filled with all the weird and wonderful things about winter sports, I'll respond to those 10 items point-by-point.
10) Founders’ intent.
The point here is that the founders of the Olympics never intended for winter sports to be included. My counter is, with respect to the modern games, that they also intended for them to be for men, who were white and rich, alone. With respect to the original Olympics, they too were male dominated, and not open to all. And, how much snow would you actually get in the settled bits of ancient Greece? Not much. Heck, the original founder, Heracles - not whom she had in mind - is hardly someone to look up to. In sum, argument fail.
9) The Winter Games just doesn’t draw the same crowd.
Fair enough: fewer people watch it than the summer ones, and yes there are far more countries who participate in the summer ones than the winter ones. Point conceded. Still, seeing the thronging masses in downtown Vancouver for the gold medal mens' hockey game 4 years ago or the 40,000 or so in the cold at the base of the ski jump hill in Lillihammer 20 years ago it's hard to get a bit of a chill watching the Winter Olympics...
8) Almost every Winter Olympic event can be summarized as follows: Someone is on a plane of snow or ice (it can be flat, or inclined) and that person falls down or does not fall down.
I think this argument fails itself. And, a ridiculous amount of skill goes into each and every one of those events. How much skill is involved in running straight for 10 seconds? Or doing a pirouette and then chucking a little metal ball? Have you ever tried skiing downhill at speed on skis and then jumped dozens of feet in the air, done a host of flips, and landed perfectly? Now how about going downhill backwards? And jumping facing backwards? And landing facing backwards? In sum, argument fail.
7) The Olympics is supposed to be a world Games, not a Snow-World Games.
See 9) - she's repeating herself. Still, point conceded. Cost is an issue and Canada is a rich country.
6) Even the weakest summer sports are more interesting than some of the strongest winter sports.
Seriously? Most winter sports are faster and involve a great deal more skill than a great deal of the summer sports. Yes, curling doesn't appeal to all. But archery? Or shooting? Or any running event? How are those better than their winter equivalents? In the winter games you not only shoot, but you shoot after cross country skiing. If you fall while speed skating, well, that's just part of the sport. If you fall while running in any sprint you're an idiot. To reply using her own language, if I wanted to watch someone run and be entertained, I could watch someone run down the sidewalk, bags and hair flying, towards his or her bus as it speeds off. In sum, argument fail.
5) The barrier to entry is lower.
Again, see 9) and 7). 3 of her 10 points essentially say the same thing. Point conceded but overall argument fail.
4) You can’t tell if the participants are attractive or not because everyone is wearing layers that make them look like either those dancing windsocks outside used car dealerships or Power Rangers.
Really? Last time I checked Olympic sport was about athletic achievement rather than the sexuality of the participants. In sum, argument fail.
3) In recent memory, the Opening Ceremonies at the Summer Games have been infinitely weirder.
I don't know. The closing ceremonies to the Vancouver games were very entertaining. With that said, I tend not to watch these. So...undecided.
2) Star caliber.
This is all relative. Yes, Usain Bolt is undoubtedly more famous than any athlete from the winter games the world over, to give one example. But in Canada the members of the men's hockey team are more famous than just about any athlete from the summer games from any country, to give another example. I'm going to go with a draw with this one.
1) Curling.
Nearly every track and field event. In sum, argument fail.
In conclusion, the Winter Olympics come out on top 5-1. There were 2 draws, and 3 possible arguments for summer games were actually just variations of 1 argument. Even if we count all of those, winter still comes out on top 5-4. I'll count that as another gold medal for Canada.
10) Founders’ intent.
The point here is that the founders of the Olympics never intended for winter sports to be included. My counter is, with respect to the modern games, that they also intended for them to be for men, who were white and rich, alone. With respect to the original Olympics, they too were male dominated, and not open to all. And, how much snow would you actually get in the settled bits of ancient Greece? Not much. Heck, the original founder, Heracles - not whom she had in mind - is hardly someone to look up to. In sum, argument fail.
9) The Winter Games just doesn’t draw the same crowd.
Fair enough: fewer people watch it than the summer ones, and yes there are far more countries who participate in the summer ones than the winter ones. Point conceded. Still, seeing the thronging masses in downtown Vancouver for the gold medal mens' hockey game 4 years ago or the 40,000 or so in the cold at the base of the ski jump hill in Lillihammer 20 years ago it's hard to get a bit of a chill watching the Winter Olympics...
8) Almost every Winter Olympic event can be summarized as follows: Someone is on a plane of snow or ice (it can be flat, or inclined) and that person falls down or does not fall down.
I think this argument fails itself. And, a ridiculous amount of skill goes into each and every one of those events. How much skill is involved in running straight for 10 seconds? Or doing a pirouette and then chucking a little metal ball? Have you ever tried skiing downhill at speed on skis and then jumped dozens of feet in the air, done a host of flips, and landed perfectly? Now how about going downhill backwards? And jumping facing backwards? And landing facing backwards? In sum, argument fail.
7) The Olympics is supposed to be a world Games, not a Snow-World Games.
See 9) - she's repeating herself. Still, point conceded. Cost is an issue and Canada is a rich country.
6) Even the weakest summer sports are more interesting than some of the strongest winter sports.
Seriously? Most winter sports are faster and involve a great deal more skill than a great deal of the summer sports. Yes, curling doesn't appeal to all. But archery? Or shooting? Or any running event? How are those better than their winter equivalents? In the winter games you not only shoot, but you shoot after cross country skiing. If you fall while speed skating, well, that's just part of the sport. If you fall while running in any sprint you're an idiot. To reply using her own language, if I wanted to watch someone run and be entertained, I could watch someone run down the sidewalk, bags and hair flying, towards his or her bus as it speeds off. In sum, argument fail.
5) The barrier to entry is lower.
Again, see 9) and 7). 3 of her 10 points essentially say the same thing. Point conceded but overall argument fail.
4) You can’t tell if the participants are attractive or not because everyone is wearing layers that make them look like either those dancing windsocks outside used car dealerships or Power Rangers.
Really? Last time I checked Olympic sport was about athletic achievement rather than the sexuality of the participants. In sum, argument fail.
3) In recent memory, the Opening Ceremonies at the Summer Games have been infinitely weirder.
I don't know. The closing ceremonies to the Vancouver games were very entertaining. With that said, I tend not to watch these. So...undecided.
2) Star caliber.
This is all relative. Yes, Usain Bolt is undoubtedly more famous than any athlete from the winter games the world over, to give one example. But in Canada the members of the men's hockey team are more famous than just about any athlete from the summer games from any country, to give another example. I'm going to go with a draw with this one.
1) Curling.
Nearly every track and field event. In sum, argument fail.
In conclusion, the Winter Olympics come out on top 5-1. There were 2 draws, and 3 possible arguments for summer games were actually just variations of 1 argument. Even if we count all of those, winter still comes out on top 5-4. I'll count that as another gold medal for Canada.
Tuesday 11 February 2014
Historical Accuracy, Television Drama, and Storytelling
It's been a while since I've posted anything, and so to get myself back into the groove I thought I'd start with something light: the "problem" of historical inaccuracies in TV shows and movies set in historical periods. The impetus for this is the teaching of classical myth (round 5) and the BBC drama "the White Queen".
If you haven't seen it, BBC's "the White Queen" is set in late medieval England in the years leading up to Henry VII's (Tudor - father of the more famous Henry VIII) seizure of the English crown - I've seen three episodes and so far he's just a boy. One of the most familiar figures in the show to the masses today is likely Richard III, the king in the car park. I confess I know little about the English monarchy, but I've enjoyed the show so far. It's something of a slower and vaguely historical version of "Game of Thrones". While watching, my curiosity has gotten the better of me and I've resorted to - gasp! - wikipedia for some background on Edward IV, the (XVIth) Earl of Warwick, et al.
No second season is planned, at least one produced by the BBC (though Starz has other ideas). While perusing the websites that set out the critical reception of the show I discovered that one of the issues that has attracted some criticism is the ever-present issue of historical accuracy. Some have bemoaned the lack of this in the show. For example, some have found fault with the dashingly white teeth, others with the location of the Battle of Bosworth (an episode I haven't reached yet - summary of these comments here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_White_Queen_(TV_series)#Historical_accuracy). This leads to the main subject of this blog: does historical accuracy really matter to an appreciation of an historical drama (TV or movie)?
As a classicist cum-historian cum-Romanist cum-Byzantinist, etc., etc., you're often asked what you think or how you view movies and television shows set in the ancient or early medieval worlds. The usual assumption is that you spend the bulk of your time nitpicking. In truth, however, I don't. In fact, as long as something historical is vaguely plausible, that's all that matters so long as the story and the characters are compelling. Do people really watch historical dramas to learn about the respective historical contexts? Or do they watch them to be entertained, and maybe even challenged on some level or other?
To my mind, it's not really important whether specific details are right or wrong, particularly if they're small like teeth colour (though some issues, like teeth colour or something similar can make for interesting commentary with friends). If an author/screenwriter/etc. changes a few details here and there but it serves to strengthen the story then all the better. Fact is, despite the historical context, they are still, by and large, works of fiction, even if they are 'based on a true story'.
This is where historical dramas are in many respects a lot like classical myths (or the texts that tell them), at least to my mind. What makes a particular version of a myth compelling is when the author takes the bare bones of an earlier or traditional story and makes it his or her own in an interesting way. Electra and the trials and tribulations of her brother (Orestes), mother (Clytemnestra), and father (Agamemnon) provide the bare bones of a good story. Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles each wrote their own version. Intriguingly, they all did slightly different things with the story (here - Orestes' and Electra's revenge against Clytemnestra and Aegisthus), and perhaps one of, if not, THE main characters, Electra. I'm particularly drawn to the Electra of Euripides, who has to spur her brother on to murder their mother. Basically, what I like is not how closely Euripides sticks to an original story (which we can't know anyway), but what he does with what we know. For me it works the same for a good historical drama. Getting back to the "White Queen", what makes it good to me is not how accurate the setting and costumes are, but how good the characters and the actors who play them are; those who play Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Warwick are particularly noteworthy. The story too is enthralling: there's plenty of murder, political wrangling, and courtly intrigue.
So, does historical accuracy really matter? To me, no. Ultimately, it all comes down to the story.
If you haven't seen it, BBC's "the White Queen" is set in late medieval England in the years leading up to Henry VII's (Tudor - father of the more famous Henry VIII) seizure of the English crown - I've seen three episodes and so far he's just a boy. One of the most familiar figures in the show to the masses today is likely Richard III, the king in the car park. I confess I know little about the English monarchy, but I've enjoyed the show so far. It's something of a slower and vaguely historical version of "Game of Thrones". While watching, my curiosity has gotten the better of me and I've resorted to - gasp! - wikipedia for some background on Edward IV, the (XVIth) Earl of Warwick, et al.
No second season is planned, at least one produced by the BBC (though Starz has other ideas). While perusing the websites that set out the critical reception of the show I discovered that one of the issues that has attracted some criticism is the ever-present issue of historical accuracy. Some have bemoaned the lack of this in the show. For example, some have found fault with the dashingly white teeth, others with the location of the Battle of Bosworth (an episode I haven't reached yet - summary of these comments here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_White_Queen_(TV_series)#Historical_accuracy). This leads to the main subject of this blog: does historical accuracy really matter to an appreciation of an historical drama (TV or movie)?
As a classicist cum-historian cum-Romanist cum-Byzantinist, etc., etc., you're often asked what you think or how you view movies and television shows set in the ancient or early medieval worlds. The usual assumption is that you spend the bulk of your time nitpicking. In truth, however, I don't. In fact, as long as something historical is vaguely plausible, that's all that matters so long as the story and the characters are compelling. Do people really watch historical dramas to learn about the respective historical contexts? Or do they watch them to be entertained, and maybe even challenged on some level or other?
To my mind, it's not really important whether specific details are right or wrong, particularly if they're small like teeth colour (though some issues, like teeth colour or something similar can make for interesting commentary with friends). If an author/screenwriter/etc. changes a few details here and there but it serves to strengthen the story then all the better. Fact is, despite the historical context, they are still, by and large, works of fiction, even if they are 'based on a true story'.
This is where historical dramas are in many respects a lot like classical myths (or the texts that tell them), at least to my mind. What makes a particular version of a myth compelling is when the author takes the bare bones of an earlier or traditional story and makes it his or her own in an interesting way. Electra and the trials and tribulations of her brother (Orestes), mother (Clytemnestra), and father (Agamemnon) provide the bare bones of a good story. Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles each wrote their own version. Intriguingly, they all did slightly different things with the story (here - Orestes' and Electra's revenge against Clytemnestra and Aegisthus), and perhaps one of, if not, THE main characters, Electra. I'm particularly drawn to the Electra of Euripides, who has to spur her brother on to murder their mother. Basically, what I like is not how closely Euripides sticks to an original story (which we can't know anyway), but what he does with what we know. For me it works the same for a good historical drama. Getting back to the "White Queen", what makes it good to me is not how accurate the setting and costumes are, but how good the characters and the actors who play them are; those who play Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Warwick are particularly noteworthy. The story too is enthralling: there's plenty of murder, political wrangling, and courtly intrigue.
So, does historical accuracy really matter? To me, no. Ultimately, it all comes down to the story.
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