I just finished reading Peter Heather's (PH) Rome Resurgent, which I now have to write a review for. When I first heard about the book, I was both excited and horribly disappointed: excited because I love the topic and have read some of Heather's other work, disappointed because it looked like he had done what I had done. The good news, for me, is that he doesn't quite seem to have done what I had intended: write a detailed study of the impact of Justinian's wars on the fate of the empire. Yes, this is what the book purports to do - and to some degree it does just that, but not quite in the way that I would.
I'm not going to get into all the nitty-gritty here; most of that will have to wait for the review. That being said, there is one issue I want to raise, which PH got to, or at least underlined, at the end: how do you rule for a really long time? As PH makes clear, Justinian (J) did a lot of things while he was emperor, some of which are quite significant, with four items the accomplishments that usually get most of the attention: wars of conquest, legal reforms, building of Hagia Sophia, and the closing of the Academy in Athens. Besides those accomplishments, PH illustrates well J's determination in a number of other capacities, including the religious sphere, for J, like many before and after, strove to bring unity to the Christian church, though with mixed results.
As PH sees J, a great deal of his accomplishments should be ascribed to his attempts to prove his credentials (for rule) and, in the aftermath of the Nika revolt, restore order and his lost prestige (or something to that effect). J didn't have a clear plan with the west. Rather, with real challenges to his rule all around, J needed to find some means of consolidating his power, and military success in far-flung places, as the opportunities arose, seemed the best bet. Yes, there was some strategic thinking on J's and his empire's part, but little of it was long term, and PH argues there's not much in the way of concern for the wellbeing of that empire. Ultimately, then, while J doesn't deserve the blame for the later ills of the empire, which were largely the result of the world war (as PH calls it) of the later sixth century, most of his success would seem to be a combination of opportunism and - as I take PH's underlying message - dumb luck.
Like others, PH sees J as an emperor only out for number one, with little regard for his people and what impact his policies had on them. He was quite happy to plunder and pillage if it got him what he wanted, and that was control of the empire. So, the many thousands who died in Constantinople itself, or the wider parts of the empire at large (Antioch, North Africa, Italy), mattered little. Many have seen J as a particularly harsh ruler, and PH would seem to fall on this side of the spectrum, if not quite at the far end.
This is where I come in. I don't want to make a judgement on J's cruelty here, but I do wonder if the absence of long term strategic planning fits well with what we know about J's reign. Few emperors lived and reigned as long as J. While many of PH's explanations are perfectly reasonable, is it really possible to rule for nearly 40 years on dumb luck, or something a little more sophisticated than that? Augustus' long reign is undoubtedly due to his careful networking, planning, and plotting - and like J, he was a master propagandist. Even if J didn't have any real long term version at the start of his reign, the near disastrous Nika riot would, to my mind, seem to have provided just such an opportunity, after the dust settled, for J to carefully, with Theodora's help, work out how to rule for a long time without the same kinds of crises. Rather importantly, it seems to have worked, despite all the challenges that he later faced, from the death of his wife and the onset of the plague, which might have afflicted J himself, to the Persian invasions of 540 and the 559 Kutrigur attack of Constantinople.
This doesn't necessarily mean that J had a long term plan to conquer the west and rebuild the ancient pan-Mediterranean empire. A good part of J's initiatives on that front truly could have been the result of circumstances, and I don't doubt that J did many of the same things that many if not all pre-modern rules have done to ensure rule, including prove their religious and military mettle. I think the absence of detail - and insufficient evidence - are the cause of some of my dissatisfaction with the explanation PH offers. I guess then too that what I'd also like to know more about is how exactly an emperor like J went about carrying out his foreign policy objectives - and even how he created them in the first place. To what degree were there sets of instructions, or guidelines, left from previous rulers that laid out some of this stuff? Anyway, what the book proves to me, at least for the moment, that my 'great' "impact of war under Justinian" project isn't dead yet, and in fact might be in better shape than I'd feared. Now if only I hadn't just sent in a proposal for a big research project on Ammianus. Oh well, maybe it'll get rejected in April? :)
Showing posts with label Roman army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Roman army. Show all posts
Wednesday, 10 October 2018
Thursday, 17 May 2018
Isidore of Seville and Vegetius
No trees yet. I think a post on trees is coming - it'll mostly be pictures - but not yet. I want to see out this thread, in part because I had more to say after completing the last post.
In the last post I noted the discrepancy between Isidore's figures for the subdivisions of the legion and Aulus Gellius', my possible/probable source. The number of centuries and maniples seemed fine, but the number of cohorts was off, turmae were added, and Isidore gave a troop total, namely 6000. Where did the extra material come from?
One reasonable possibility is Vegetius, the famed and popular (in the medieval era) writer of the Epitoma Rei Militaris. Vegetius, as I'm sure I've mentioned before (and as you may already know), spends a good deal of time in his work discussing the ancient legion, which Sylvain Janniard has identified with the legion of the Severan dynasty. While Janniard doesn't argue that Vegetius' legion is a bang-on copy of that earlier one, he makes a good case. At the same time, there's still scope for other legionary components to find themselves in Vegetius' corpus.
First, Vegetius isn't the source, it seems, of Isidore's definition of a maniple, which runs (9.3.50, trans. Bentley et al.): "A maniple consists of two hundred soldiers soldiers. These troops are called maniples either because they would begin a battle in the first combat, or because, before battle-standards existed, they would make 'handfuls' for themselves as standards, that is, bundles of straw or of some plant, and from this standard the soldiers were nicknamed 'manipulars'." Isidore then gives a quotation from Lucan (1.296), which mentions maniples rallied around standards, and which seems only vaguely related. That said, one of the definitions for manipulus in the Lewis and Short reads as follows: "B. Because the ancient Romans adopted a pole, with a handful of hay or straw twisted about it, as the standard of a company of soldiers; in milit. lang., a certain number of soldiers belonging to the same standard, a company, maniple; generally applied to infantry, and only by way of exception to cavalry". So Isidore and Lewis and Short seem to agree, at least in part, on the origin of the term maniple. For Vegetius, however, a maniple could be a couple of things: first (2.13), it could be another word for contubernium, or at least an earlier form of that term. Secondly, he conflates century and maniple (2.14). Why the discrepancy? I think it's due to the same reason that Isidore explains maniple (manipulus) in terms of first combat (manus), as the translators have it. He says the contubernium used to be called a maniple because they found in groups (manus) joined together. What we seem to have is some disagreement between Vegetius and Isidore over what manus means in this military context, or at least this organizational one (both are right).
Just because they disagree over maniples and manus, that doesn't exclude Vegetius as a potential source for Isidore's much larger legion (in Isidore's 6000 range) and its attendant turmae. Vegetius (2.2) gives the size for a legion as 6000 (2.2 - sena milia), and the passage in which we find this is not unlike Isidore's (9.3.46), a point not lost on Milner (p. 31, n. 7): both refer to the regiments of Macedonians and Gauls, though Vegetius includes many more. Vegetius' (2.6) legion only contains ten cohorts, however, not Isidore's twelve, and it could have as many as 6100 men and 726 cavalry. Seems reasonable (though nothing like conclusive) to suppose that this is the source of Isidore's 6000 soldiers. And, as noted in the previous post or two (can't remember), Isidore would seem to be modifying his source material as he sees fit.
But Vegetius doesn't append turmae to his legion, and speaks of legionary cavalry solely in terms of numbers of soldiers, at least when he first brings them up at 2.2. That doesn't mean he leaves out turmae; rather, that he saves them for a different discussion. At 2.14, he has a section entitled "On the Turmae of Legionary Cavalry" (XIIII. De turmis equitum legionariorum). Therein he says that one turma contained thirty-two men, just two off Isidore's thirty (9.3.51). The rest of the discussion concerns the duties of decurions and ideal types - it reminds me of Procopius' horse-archers. Anyway, it's easy to imagine Isidore taking the number and rounding it out to better fit the other figures he gave for the legionary divisions, though it doesn't quite explain how he got to 200 turmae. When he discusses their 30-man size, he's reasonably accurate, and his vague connection (in my mind) of turmae with republican politics isn't far off the mark. What he might have done, then, is simply conflated the 200 cavalry usually associated with a legion and forgotten that a turma isn't applied to individual soldiers.
So there we go: the first half (or its original incarnation) of that little phrase in Isidore possibly/probably from Cincius via Aulus Gellius (not listed as a citation in the translation I'm using), and the modifications from Vegetius. Of course, there could even have been an intermediary, like Cato, who's work on military matters is lost. For the moment, I'll stick with what I've got. Ultimately, too, this should help me to understand how Ammianus uses forms of manipulus and legio, believe it or not. To close: I enjoy looking into Roman military divisions and subdivisions more than most things. Next...maybe tonight...trees?
In the last post I noted the discrepancy between Isidore's figures for the subdivisions of the legion and Aulus Gellius', my possible/probable source. The number of centuries and maniples seemed fine, but the number of cohorts was off, turmae were added, and Isidore gave a troop total, namely 6000. Where did the extra material come from?
One reasonable possibility is Vegetius, the famed and popular (in the medieval era) writer of the Epitoma Rei Militaris. Vegetius, as I'm sure I've mentioned before (and as you may already know), spends a good deal of time in his work discussing the ancient legion, which Sylvain Janniard has identified with the legion of the Severan dynasty. While Janniard doesn't argue that Vegetius' legion is a bang-on copy of that earlier one, he makes a good case. At the same time, there's still scope for other legionary components to find themselves in Vegetius' corpus.
First, Vegetius isn't the source, it seems, of Isidore's definition of a maniple, which runs (9.3.50, trans. Bentley et al.): "A maniple consists of two hundred soldiers soldiers. These troops are called maniples either because they would begin a battle in the first combat, or because, before battle-standards existed, they would make 'handfuls' for themselves as standards, that is, bundles of straw or of some plant, and from this standard the soldiers were nicknamed 'manipulars'." Isidore then gives a quotation from Lucan (1.296), which mentions maniples rallied around standards, and which seems only vaguely related. That said, one of the definitions for manipulus in the Lewis and Short reads as follows: "B. Because the ancient Romans adopted a pole, with a handful of hay or straw twisted about it, as the standard of a company of soldiers; in milit. lang., a certain number of soldiers belonging to the same standard, a company, maniple; generally applied to infantry, and only by way of exception to cavalry". So Isidore and Lewis and Short seem to agree, at least in part, on the origin of the term maniple. For Vegetius, however, a maniple could be a couple of things: first (2.13), it could be another word for contubernium, or at least an earlier form of that term. Secondly, he conflates century and maniple (2.14). Why the discrepancy? I think it's due to the same reason that Isidore explains maniple (manipulus) in terms of first combat (manus), as the translators have it. He says the contubernium used to be called a maniple because they found in groups (manus) joined together. What we seem to have is some disagreement between Vegetius and Isidore over what manus means in this military context, or at least this organizational one (both are right).
Just because they disagree over maniples and manus, that doesn't exclude Vegetius as a potential source for Isidore's much larger legion (in Isidore's 6000 range) and its attendant turmae. Vegetius (2.2) gives the size for a legion as 6000 (2.2 - sena milia), and the passage in which we find this is not unlike Isidore's (9.3.46), a point not lost on Milner (p. 31, n. 7): both refer to the regiments of Macedonians and Gauls, though Vegetius includes many more. Vegetius' (2.6) legion only contains ten cohorts, however, not Isidore's twelve, and it could have as many as 6100 men and 726 cavalry. Seems reasonable (though nothing like conclusive) to suppose that this is the source of Isidore's 6000 soldiers. And, as noted in the previous post or two (can't remember), Isidore would seem to be modifying his source material as he sees fit.
But Vegetius doesn't append turmae to his legion, and speaks of legionary cavalry solely in terms of numbers of soldiers, at least when he first brings them up at 2.2. That doesn't mean he leaves out turmae; rather, that he saves them for a different discussion. At 2.14, he has a section entitled "On the Turmae of Legionary Cavalry" (XIIII. De turmis equitum legionariorum). Therein he says that one turma contained thirty-two men, just two off Isidore's thirty (9.3.51). The rest of the discussion concerns the duties of decurions and ideal types - it reminds me of Procopius' horse-archers. Anyway, it's easy to imagine Isidore taking the number and rounding it out to better fit the other figures he gave for the legionary divisions, though it doesn't quite explain how he got to 200 turmae. When he discusses their 30-man size, he's reasonably accurate, and his vague connection (in my mind) of turmae with republican politics isn't far off the mark. What he might have done, then, is simply conflated the 200 cavalry usually associated with a legion and forgotten that a turma isn't applied to individual soldiers.
So there we go: the first half (or its original incarnation) of that little phrase in Isidore possibly/probably from Cincius via Aulus Gellius (not listed as a citation in the translation I'm using), and the modifications from Vegetius. Of course, there could even have been an intermediary, like Cato, who's work on military matters is lost. For the moment, I'll stick with what I've got. Ultimately, too, this should help me to understand how Ammianus uses forms of manipulus and legio, believe it or not. To close: I enjoy looking into Roman military divisions and subdivisions more than most things. Next...maybe tonight...trees?
Tuesday, 8 August 2017
Even Further Reflections on the Roman Military Panel
Black to the blurbs...
Cary Barber, "The 'Lost Generation'..."
Barber noted the extreme war time losses during the Hannibalic war, which might, in the case of senators, have meant a depletion of as much as 60% of their numbers. The senate, in general, had a regular cycle of death of renewal, but this was thrown off by all the deaths in the war. For the years from 366-218 BC, there were fewer and fewer men repeating the consulship, in part (or largely?) the result of the Lex Livinia. All the deaths threw this off, and Romans were willing to let men repeat consulships as a result of all the Hannibalic madness.
Michael Fronda, "Titus Quinctius Flamininus'..."
Fronda highlighted the looking at old questions in new ways that seemed to dominate discussion so far. He commented on narratives and the memories of war, with the triumph itself serving as a kind of narrative (an interesting point - has me thinking about the varied narratives of war in the age of Justinian). Allies participated in some triumphs, though generally irregularly, starting in 187 BC (probably). The idea is that Flamininus' triumph in 187 was an experiment in just this (bringing in allies).
Jessica Clark, "Anecdotal History..."
There were a handful of papers that touched on the social war, this being one of them, with her aim being to meld history and historiography. She noted the Social War was a difficult event to grasp, with some modern scholars starting their discussions before it, or after it. Evidently, Diodorus Siculus called the war the greatest war that was ever known - and not at the start of his entire work, but just that section. Struck me as very preface-y, (and I jotted lots of Procopius-themed points, surprisingly) though I gather there are all sorts of problems with the text as is (still I might have to come back to this). The evidence for the social war is problematic, and she asks whether we'd understand it better with more evidence - though another question is whether we should be asking different questions.
Nathan Rosenstein, "Tributum, Latin Revolt..."
He said two great questions for the republic were: how did it get such a great empire, and what caused it to fall apart. Says war and military service played a role in all this, which is part of the reason why they're worth studying. Touches on the communicative turn (not convinced by), and says warfare was (one of?) the best way(s) for individuals to interact with each other. This, to me, was a fascinating point, and I think Milne brought up something comparable, either in her talk or in her questions. While soldiers did spend time fighting, much of it wasn't. And even when they were at war, they often had to travel to get there (set up camp, etc.). So, there were plenty of opportunities for men to chat (and sing). Back specifically to Rosenstein: Livy provided lots of evidence of the deaths of military tribunes, which suggests they didn't hold back when fighting. Additionally, war (and the Hannibalic war too) was a means for elites to prove their worth. Along those lines, cavalry provided many more opportunities to prove all this than service in the infantry (in lines, part of a group, etc.). Rosenstein notes the changing culture of the soldier in the 1st century BC, though also the 2nd century BC, and the 3rd century BC (and so on). This brought up an interesting question (in my mind at least): what would my three men for my army textbook think if they were transported into each others' Roman worlds? I believe we were into the discussion now, but when soldiers came back from war, how did they integrate back into regular life? Is the biggest change from the Social War (in terms of military stuff) the integration of all these Roman and Italian men? Were men recruited from all over? These last couple of points surprised me (my ignorance) - I'd assumed republican recruitment was more uniform, and hadn't appreciated all this complexity.
Francois Gauthier, "The Transformation of the..."
In this paper he basically says we shouldn't give all this credit to Gaius Marius for his late second/early first century reforms. I had done, to some degree, in the past, but found his arguments convincing. Rather, to pick up the social war theme, he said this was the turning point. I discovered that Roman citizen cavalry hadn't been replaced in the first century BC (or earlier) by allies (this from McCall's book). Allies were apparently much cheaper to use than Roman soldiers, because they paid for themselves, apparently (to do with taxies, indemnities, and such, I think - plus they pay for their own men and equipment). There were some useful references to chase down: Front. 2.3.17, Cic. Verr. 5.60 (can't remember why). Also, intriguingly enough, Pompey's armies were allegedly comprised of men from 33 ethnicities (this following an article in Historia from the 60s - have to track it down). There were lots of comments about paying for soldiers, and the challenges this provided.
Jack Wells, "The Lessons of..."
His paper was about Augustan historiography, and really about Roman beliefs about where they came from. Lots of ways to tell a story, and one interesting figure with a fascinating backstory is Servius Tullius, both a slave and divine. Most sources rate him highly. He notes the weirdness about Rome: any foreigners who show up in early Rome could be made citizens, which wasn't the case for slaves. Additionally, it was fortune that made you a slave (contra Aristotle's natural slavery views). If you're a slave captured in war, you've proven some form of honour (this the view of Dionysius on early slaves). Some interesting points about Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whom I'd never thought much about before: he does apparently try to explain how the Romans do things to a Greek audience (an interesting point). One of the big takeaways is the permeability of categories in all this.
Brian Turner, "'Bloodless Victories..."
There are a host of examples in which battles were won but the Romans hadn't suffered any casualties. All sorts of interesting comments here (like all them, again). Claudius celebrated taking Britain without any losses, and Turner asked whether the Romans were losing their appetite for war. Bloodless victories are apparently found in every decade of Livy's book, and apparently Sallust gets into it too. Men wanted to limit their own losses, and it was asked if there was a practical component to this. He touches on Mons Graupius, Josephus and Jotapata, Tactius, Civilis, and the Batavian uprising, the Adamklissi monument, and he asks if the discourse of bloodless victory (he's influenced by John Lynn) could influence how a general performed. One point raised in discussion (and which I hadn't considered), was that Lendon's view of combat was too elitist (all this virtus stuff - did ordinary soldiers really care about it?). There was a question too about whether all this bloodless victory stuff was really about hiding losses.
Sara Phang, "Reviewing the Marriage..."
An update, of sorts, following her book on marriage. All very convincing (read her work). She notes the importance of documentary sources for the imperial era. She asks what the most useful approach is to studying women, families, and the army. She gets into who's serving and where are they from. She sees epitaphs as cultural patterns, and looks at the changing depictions of soldiers on epitaphs - very interesting. Think I'd contemplated it before, but not really given it much thought. I think I'd like to get my hands on as many depictions of soldiers on epitaphs as I can find. Anyway, she notes the contrast between epitaphs, which involved lots of choice on the part of the individual, and the diploma, which was a legal document that allowed for limited choice. She compared Hdn. 3.8.5 saying soldiers lived with wives to Eck's comments (2011) about a diploma of 206 which suggested that soldiers still lacked conubium at this time. Noted too Allison's book (2013: 353) where she said women made up 5-24% of the inhabitants on bases. All sorts of strong evidence for women on bases (skeletons, shoes, jewellery, spindles and textile-production items, children's clothes, infant burials). She implied too that women were involved in some of the production of military things, which I hadn't considered (and which I should touch on in later studies).
Allison Keith, "Love's Figures..."
A fascinating paper, though I'd really flagged by this point. My expertise in Latin poetry also happens to be lacking. Anyway, she looked for epigraphic evidence (in Italy) for some of the slaves alluded to in classical-era Latin poetry. The few names we find on epitaphs are resonant of Roman imperial conquest - and they could be seen as a celebration of the spoils of war. Nemesis, evidently, was a popular name. Inscriptions, as it happens, offer a useful social context and comparanda to what we find in the poetry. They give us something of the human costs to Roman conquest and imperialism, and this is definitely stuff I want to use in my textbook (and updated chapter for a textbook). She argues that the contemporaneity of the names in poetry reflects the slaves/people captured in war. Very useful bibliography including, especially, all the work by K Gaca (only read one of her papers, I think).
Justin Ryan James, "Expressing triumph..."
This about the images of the turn of battle in Roman imperial-era art. Fascinating stuff. They show the moments before the turn of battle - and this reminded me of the scenes of myth from Roman art, where they tend to show the moments before the bad shit happens. I brought this up in discussion, but I'm not sure I was terribly eloquent: my point was is this a wider genre thing (where the genre is the visual arts generally, perhaps a bit too specific), where there were established topoi, motifs, and tendencies across different themes in art. Anyway, continuing on from the turn of battle, he noted that cavalry always went from left to right on scenes, but infantry could go in any direction. The commander is usually the largest person. There are some images he had which I hadn't come across before, like the Tropaeum Alpium from La Turbie, France, the Etruscan Celtomachy from Florence, Tiberius' Arch, and the architrave from Mantua. He referred, too, to something from Glanum (Roman legionaries marching?), and Romanius Capito, a grave stele dated to 60-65. Lots of emphasis on cavalry on these monuments.
James Gersbach, "A reinterpretation..."
His paper was about the war-cry, though he preferred the term "battle expression", which covered everything from sound, to a song, dance, silence, and any sort of experience. His paper was chalk full of interesting references to sounds and the like. He argued that these were rehearsed, and that served all sorts of purposes. Lots of juicy stuff here for my sensory approach to battle book. Gersbach argued that the socio-political force of these cries were missed by some scholarship. He asked, too, who is likely to have initiated these cries (this garnered some discussion - spontaneous - paraells to haka and European football chants). Were they organic - again, like football chants? Many of my notes are copies of references. Will have to come back to these. Intriguing - evidently he's doing a whole thesis on ancient battle cries.
Me..blah, blah blah...eurasian, blah, cavalry.
For me, the very last speaker, I want only to note the great questions I got so that I don't forget them. There were questions about specialization (greater or lesser in the sixth century), and whether dragoons were a thing (a question that's come up elsewhere - Alofs, for instance). Justin noted some interesting material about the training of Ottoman horsearchers. Hmmm...most of the questions might be lost to the sands of time. But, someone did ask about how professional the men were, and how this might have varied between the ranks. Were they all professional? Only some? I'd mentioned recruitment a little, which seems both haphazard and more official in the sources: when it comes to the Gothic Wars, it seems a bit haphazard, for generals are often sent to the Balkans to round up men. On the other hand, we know a bit about the official parts of recruitment from the law codes - and we even seem to have a relevant papyrus, a probatoria (the document even says so), that describes this. So mixed image. What do I make of Procopius in these instances? Is he glossing over official practice for the sake of the narrative? Are the troops they're getting of a lower quality because of the needs of the situation? - and this reminds me of his comments on the Lycaonians at Callinicum, which he'd said had only just enlisted. The cost issue surfaced too. I don't know how many horse archers there were (don't seem to be significant), but they would have costed a great deal, especially if the horses were covered with armour, so they never could have that many. This, then, too, casts doubt on it being an age of Hippotoxotai.
The end. That's it. Lots to digest. Extremely useful for all the things I have on the go. I'd thought about making a post about raids and early and late Rome, its increasing and then decreasing civility, etc., but my eyes are fuzzy and I should go to the gym to process.
Cary Barber, "The 'Lost Generation'..."
Barber noted the extreme war time losses during the Hannibalic war, which might, in the case of senators, have meant a depletion of as much as 60% of their numbers. The senate, in general, had a regular cycle of death of renewal, but this was thrown off by all the deaths in the war. For the years from 366-218 BC, there were fewer and fewer men repeating the consulship, in part (or largely?) the result of the Lex Livinia. All the deaths threw this off, and Romans were willing to let men repeat consulships as a result of all the Hannibalic madness.
Michael Fronda, "Titus Quinctius Flamininus'..."
Fronda highlighted the looking at old questions in new ways that seemed to dominate discussion so far. He commented on narratives and the memories of war, with the triumph itself serving as a kind of narrative (an interesting point - has me thinking about the varied narratives of war in the age of Justinian). Allies participated in some triumphs, though generally irregularly, starting in 187 BC (probably). The idea is that Flamininus' triumph in 187 was an experiment in just this (bringing in allies).
Jessica Clark, "Anecdotal History..."
There were a handful of papers that touched on the social war, this being one of them, with her aim being to meld history and historiography. She noted the Social War was a difficult event to grasp, with some modern scholars starting their discussions before it, or after it. Evidently, Diodorus Siculus called the war the greatest war that was ever known - and not at the start of his entire work, but just that section. Struck me as very preface-y, (and I jotted lots of Procopius-themed points, surprisingly) though I gather there are all sorts of problems with the text as is (still I might have to come back to this). The evidence for the social war is problematic, and she asks whether we'd understand it better with more evidence - though another question is whether we should be asking different questions.
Nathan Rosenstein, "Tributum, Latin Revolt..."
He said two great questions for the republic were: how did it get such a great empire, and what caused it to fall apart. Says war and military service played a role in all this, which is part of the reason why they're worth studying. Touches on the communicative turn (not convinced by), and says warfare was (one of?) the best way(s) for individuals to interact with each other. This, to me, was a fascinating point, and I think Milne brought up something comparable, either in her talk or in her questions. While soldiers did spend time fighting, much of it wasn't. And even when they were at war, they often had to travel to get there (set up camp, etc.). So, there were plenty of opportunities for men to chat (and sing). Back specifically to Rosenstein: Livy provided lots of evidence of the deaths of military tribunes, which suggests they didn't hold back when fighting. Additionally, war (and the Hannibalic war too) was a means for elites to prove their worth. Along those lines, cavalry provided many more opportunities to prove all this than service in the infantry (in lines, part of a group, etc.). Rosenstein notes the changing culture of the soldier in the 1st century BC, though also the 2nd century BC, and the 3rd century BC (and so on). This brought up an interesting question (in my mind at least): what would my three men for my army textbook think if they were transported into each others' Roman worlds? I believe we were into the discussion now, but when soldiers came back from war, how did they integrate back into regular life? Is the biggest change from the Social War (in terms of military stuff) the integration of all these Roman and Italian men? Were men recruited from all over? These last couple of points surprised me (my ignorance) - I'd assumed republican recruitment was more uniform, and hadn't appreciated all this complexity.
Francois Gauthier, "The Transformation of the..."
In this paper he basically says we shouldn't give all this credit to Gaius Marius for his late second/early first century reforms. I had done, to some degree, in the past, but found his arguments convincing. Rather, to pick up the social war theme, he said this was the turning point. I discovered that Roman citizen cavalry hadn't been replaced in the first century BC (or earlier) by allies (this from McCall's book). Allies were apparently much cheaper to use than Roman soldiers, because they paid for themselves, apparently (to do with taxies, indemnities, and such, I think - plus they pay for their own men and equipment). There were some useful references to chase down: Front. 2.3.17, Cic. Verr. 5.60 (can't remember why). Also, intriguingly enough, Pompey's armies were allegedly comprised of men from 33 ethnicities (this following an article in Historia from the 60s - have to track it down). There were lots of comments about paying for soldiers, and the challenges this provided.
Jack Wells, "The Lessons of..."
His paper was about Augustan historiography, and really about Roman beliefs about where they came from. Lots of ways to tell a story, and one interesting figure with a fascinating backstory is Servius Tullius, both a slave and divine. Most sources rate him highly. He notes the weirdness about Rome: any foreigners who show up in early Rome could be made citizens, which wasn't the case for slaves. Additionally, it was fortune that made you a slave (contra Aristotle's natural slavery views). If you're a slave captured in war, you've proven some form of honour (this the view of Dionysius on early slaves). Some interesting points about Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whom I'd never thought much about before: he does apparently try to explain how the Romans do things to a Greek audience (an interesting point). One of the big takeaways is the permeability of categories in all this.
Brian Turner, "'Bloodless Victories..."
There are a host of examples in which battles were won but the Romans hadn't suffered any casualties. All sorts of interesting comments here (like all them, again). Claudius celebrated taking Britain without any losses, and Turner asked whether the Romans were losing their appetite for war. Bloodless victories are apparently found in every decade of Livy's book, and apparently Sallust gets into it too. Men wanted to limit their own losses, and it was asked if there was a practical component to this. He touches on Mons Graupius, Josephus and Jotapata, Tactius, Civilis, and the Batavian uprising, the Adamklissi monument, and he asks if the discourse of bloodless victory (he's influenced by John Lynn) could influence how a general performed. One point raised in discussion (and which I hadn't considered), was that Lendon's view of combat was too elitist (all this virtus stuff - did ordinary soldiers really care about it?). There was a question too about whether all this bloodless victory stuff was really about hiding losses.
Sara Phang, "Reviewing the Marriage..."
An update, of sorts, following her book on marriage. All very convincing (read her work). She notes the importance of documentary sources for the imperial era. She asks what the most useful approach is to studying women, families, and the army. She gets into who's serving and where are they from. She sees epitaphs as cultural patterns, and looks at the changing depictions of soldiers on epitaphs - very interesting. Think I'd contemplated it before, but not really given it much thought. I think I'd like to get my hands on as many depictions of soldiers on epitaphs as I can find. Anyway, she notes the contrast between epitaphs, which involved lots of choice on the part of the individual, and the diploma, which was a legal document that allowed for limited choice. She compared Hdn. 3.8.5 saying soldiers lived with wives to Eck's comments (2011) about a diploma of 206 which suggested that soldiers still lacked conubium at this time. Noted too Allison's book (2013: 353) where she said women made up 5-24% of the inhabitants on bases. All sorts of strong evidence for women on bases (skeletons, shoes, jewellery, spindles and textile-production items, children's clothes, infant burials). She implied too that women were involved in some of the production of military things, which I hadn't considered (and which I should touch on in later studies).
Allison Keith, "Love's Figures..."
A fascinating paper, though I'd really flagged by this point. My expertise in Latin poetry also happens to be lacking. Anyway, she looked for epigraphic evidence (in Italy) for some of the slaves alluded to in classical-era Latin poetry. The few names we find on epitaphs are resonant of Roman imperial conquest - and they could be seen as a celebration of the spoils of war. Nemesis, evidently, was a popular name. Inscriptions, as it happens, offer a useful social context and comparanda to what we find in the poetry. They give us something of the human costs to Roman conquest and imperialism, and this is definitely stuff I want to use in my textbook (and updated chapter for a textbook). She argues that the contemporaneity of the names in poetry reflects the slaves/people captured in war. Very useful bibliography including, especially, all the work by K Gaca (only read one of her papers, I think).
Justin Ryan James, "Expressing triumph..."
This about the images of the turn of battle in Roman imperial-era art. Fascinating stuff. They show the moments before the turn of battle - and this reminded me of the scenes of myth from Roman art, where they tend to show the moments before the bad shit happens. I brought this up in discussion, but I'm not sure I was terribly eloquent: my point was is this a wider genre thing (where the genre is the visual arts generally, perhaps a bit too specific), where there were established topoi, motifs, and tendencies across different themes in art. Anyway, continuing on from the turn of battle, he noted that cavalry always went from left to right on scenes, but infantry could go in any direction. The commander is usually the largest person. There are some images he had which I hadn't come across before, like the Tropaeum Alpium from La Turbie, France, the Etruscan Celtomachy from Florence, Tiberius' Arch, and the architrave from Mantua. He referred, too, to something from Glanum (Roman legionaries marching?), and Romanius Capito, a grave stele dated to 60-65. Lots of emphasis on cavalry on these monuments.
James Gersbach, "A reinterpretation..."
His paper was about the war-cry, though he preferred the term "battle expression", which covered everything from sound, to a song, dance, silence, and any sort of experience. His paper was chalk full of interesting references to sounds and the like. He argued that these were rehearsed, and that served all sorts of purposes. Lots of juicy stuff here for my sensory approach to battle book. Gersbach argued that the socio-political force of these cries were missed by some scholarship. He asked, too, who is likely to have initiated these cries (this garnered some discussion - spontaneous - paraells to haka and European football chants). Were they organic - again, like football chants? Many of my notes are copies of references. Will have to come back to these. Intriguing - evidently he's doing a whole thesis on ancient battle cries.
Me..blah, blah blah...eurasian, blah, cavalry.
For me, the very last speaker, I want only to note the great questions I got so that I don't forget them. There were questions about specialization (greater or lesser in the sixth century), and whether dragoons were a thing (a question that's come up elsewhere - Alofs, for instance). Justin noted some interesting material about the training of Ottoman horsearchers. Hmmm...most of the questions might be lost to the sands of time. But, someone did ask about how professional the men were, and how this might have varied between the ranks. Were they all professional? Only some? I'd mentioned recruitment a little, which seems both haphazard and more official in the sources: when it comes to the Gothic Wars, it seems a bit haphazard, for generals are often sent to the Balkans to round up men. On the other hand, we know a bit about the official parts of recruitment from the law codes - and we even seem to have a relevant papyrus, a probatoria (the document even says so), that describes this. So mixed image. What do I make of Procopius in these instances? Is he glossing over official practice for the sake of the narrative? Are the troops they're getting of a lower quality because of the needs of the situation? - and this reminds me of his comments on the Lycaonians at Callinicum, which he'd said had only just enlisted. The cost issue surfaced too. I don't know how many horse archers there were (don't seem to be significant), but they would have costed a great deal, especially if the horses were covered with armour, so they never could have that many. This, then, too, casts doubt on it being an age of Hippotoxotai.
The end. That's it. Lots to digest. Extremely useful for all the things I have on the go. I'd thought about making a post about raids and early and late Rome, its increasing and then decreasing civility, etc., but my eyes are fuzzy and I should go to the gym to process.
Monday, 7 August 2017
Further Reflections on the Roman Military Studies Panel
For the next post on the Roman military studies panel/sessions at the Montreal CCC 2017, I'm going to give, effectively, a list of interesting points/comments/suggestions I jotted down. There are fewer for the last couple of panels (I was getting tired - more of the material covered ground I was familiar with). Here are some highlights (and apologies for overlapping with the first Montreal post).
Fred Drogula, "the Legalization of War".
Evidently early Roman warfare reads a bit like mob warfare, with wealthy clans engaging in raids led by patricians in charge of private war bands. Ultimately they were looking for plunder. Drogula asked how did military command become a legally sanctioned activity of the state given these beginnings - and I wonder how and why it regressed (if you want to call it that) back to this state at the end of antiquity. Additionally, the gradual expansion of the state led to a change in the nature of war. Along the way, some intriguing parallels were drawn between early Roman warfare and early modern Italian warfare (think Medici, etc).
Jeremy, Armstrong, "On the Eve of Empire..."
The late fourth/early third century (BC) was a period of significant change, and this included a number of different facets of the Roman state such as: weapons and armour, allies, citizenship, territory, naval power, military infrastructure, coinage, command, tactics. Despite all these changes, much had been set in motion earlier. The manipular legion was a big part of all this change. Evidently, too, the legion wasn't very phalanx-like, and fighting with a phalanx goes against all we know about warfare in early Italy (it wasn't conducive to this - surprised to hear all this, because I'd assumed the phalanx was the early method, later changed. Goes to show what I know). Indeed, he argues that the Romans were always manipular in a way because of the gentes, warbands, and tribes of early Rome, which when organized together tended to be divided into the sort of divisions that matched a maniple well. Ultimately, take Polybius' legion versus phalanx discussion with a grain of salt.
Peter Vanderpuy, "Debt Structures, Warfare, and the rise"
He too noted the gentilicial, clan-based, warfare which characterized early Rome, which was in contrast to the more state-based approach of later times. V provided an intriguing list of agrarian statues from the 12 tables (some of which had a very modern feel). He got into the formation of all these new farms that is often associated with mid-republican Rome. It got into issues of environmental history (more or less). One interesting point (or series of points) he raised pertained to the costs associated with these new farms: the suggestion was farming wasn't ingrained, for some would have had a much more successful go of things on this front than others. Finally, following Berry-Wendell (to some degree), he said the primary cultural output at Rome was its warfare.
John Serrati, "Religion and Roman Warfare..."
His paper touched on gender, and a key figure was Bellona. Bellona was present at the opening and the close of hostilities in Roman combat. For him, it was surprising that a female deity had such a prominent place in such a male part of a patriarchal society. That said, Athena had a big role in Athens too (this me), and it could hardly be praised for its gender equity. Evidently, there's much we don't know about Bellona (I'd known almost nothing) - though much of early Rome IS murky. Was Bellona Italian in origin? Roman? Who knows. She served as a war god in Rome up until Sulla (and if this is true maybe we should consider this another strike against him?). Should note some comparisons were drawn between her and Mars (who wasn't unloved at Rome).
Kathryn Milne, "The Middle Republican Soldier..."
The soldiery were vilified: there was nothing inherently noble in serving. So how did the state manage to ennoble the soldier, which it seems to have done at some point or other? As they served farther and farther from home, his faraway actions were quite different from what he did when he was at home (and this parallels nicely with more recently materials, which she discusses in her thesis, and which I have a copy of). One possible means of ennobling was the parade (triumph). Others include decorations, the volume of spoils, and their exotic prizes. She put a lot of stress on awards, which had a bonding effect, and which made soldiers feel good about themselves (and all this would be relevant to my research on the sixth century). It was important that the awards be accepted by the community at large for them to have any meaning. Some comments were made afterwards about the bodies (what did they do with them at the end of battles) and war's universality.
There are more comments from additional papers, but I'm typing this outside (it's 9:17pm at the moment) and it's getting dark, so I'll stop for the moment. Cheers
Fred Drogula, "the Legalization of War".
Evidently early Roman warfare reads a bit like mob warfare, with wealthy clans engaging in raids led by patricians in charge of private war bands. Ultimately they were looking for plunder. Drogula asked how did military command become a legally sanctioned activity of the state given these beginnings - and I wonder how and why it regressed (if you want to call it that) back to this state at the end of antiquity. Additionally, the gradual expansion of the state led to a change in the nature of war. Along the way, some intriguing parallels were drawn between early Roman warfare and early modern Italian warfare (think Medici, etc).
Jeremy, Armstrong, "On the Eve of Empire..."
The late fourth/early third century (BC) was a period of significant change, and this included a number of different facets of the Roman state such as: weapons and armour, allies, citizenship, territory, naval power, military infrastructure, coinage, command, tactics. Despite all these changes, much had been set in motion earlier. The manipular legion was a big part of all this change. Evidently, too, the legion wasn't very phalanx-like, and fighting with a phalanx goes against all we know about warfare in early Italy (it wasn't conducive to this - surprised to hear all this, because I'd assumed the phalanx was the early method, later changed. Goes to show what I know). Indeed, he argues that the Romans were always manipular in a way because of the gentes, warbands, and tribes of early Rome, which when organized together tended to be divided into the sort of divisions that matched a maniple well. Ultimately, take Polybius' legion versus phalanx discussion with a grain of salt.
Peter Vanderpuy, "Debt Structures, Warfare, and the rise"
He too noted the gentilicial, clan-based, warfare which characterized early Rome, which was in contrast to the more state-based approach of later times. V provided an intriguing list of agrarian statues from the 12 tables (some of which had a very modern feel). He got into the formation of all these new farms that is often associated with mid-republican Rome. It got into issues of environmental history (more or less). One interesting point (or series of points) he raised pertained to the costs associated with these new farms: the suggestion was farming wasn't ingrained, for some would have had a much more successful go of things on this front than others. Finally, following Berry-Wendell (to some degree), he said the primary cultural output at Rome was its warfare.
John Serrati, "Religion and Roman Warfare..."
His paper touched on gender, and a key figure was Bellona. Bellona was present at the opening and the close of hostilities in Roman combat. For him, it was surprising that a female deity had such a prominent place in such a male part of a patriarchal society. That said, Athena had a big role in Athens too (this me), and it could hardly be praised for its gender equity. Evidently, there's much we don't know about Bellona (I'd known almost nothing) - though much of early Rome IS murky. Was Bellona Italian in origin? Roman? Who knows. She served as a war god in Rome up until Sulla (and if this is true maybe we should consider this another strike against him?). Should note some comparisons were drawn between her and Mars (who wasn't unloved at Rome).
Kathryn Milne, "The Middle Republican Soldier..."
The soldiery were vilified: there was nothing inherently noble in serving. So how did the state manage to ennoble the soldier, which it seems to have done at some point or other? As they served farther and farther from home, his faraway actions were quite different from what he did when he was at home (and this parallels nicely with more recently materials, which she discusses in her thesis, and which I have a copy of). One possible means of ennobling was the parade (triumph). Others include decorations, the volume of spoils, and their exotic prizes. She put a lot of stress on awards, which had a bonding effect, and which made soldiers feel good about themselves (and all this would be relevant to my research on the sixth century). It was important that the awards be accepted by the community at large for them to have any meaning. Some comments were made afterwards about the bodies (what did they do with them at the end of battles) and war's universality.
There are more comments from additional papers, but I'm typing this outside (it's 9:17pm at the moment) and it's getting dark, so I'll stop for the moment. Cheers
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